

IRAQ-IRAN
IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT DURING THE REIGN OF THE SHAH
ON THE WAR OF 1980

A THESIS
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

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ATLANTA, GEORGIA
MAY, 1986

R=IX P=224

IN MEMORY OF MY BROTHER
ABDULSTTAR, WHO GAVE
HIS LIFE FOR HIS COUNTRY.

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PREFACE

The present day war between Iraq and Iran is not new. This war, which began on September 22, 1980, has its roots in both the immediate and remote past. The Iraqi-Iranian conflict is as old as the history of Mesopotamia. The saying that the world is ruled by the dead more than the living is true. It applies to both Iraq and Iran. This fact is the driving power behind the hatred.

In fact, the Iraq-Iran dispute is very old and its roots go back to the old history of Babylon, Nineveh and the Persian Empire.

There were times when the Persians dominated Iraq. Also, the Arabs dominated Persia after the rise of Islam in the seventh century. The border problem between Iraq and Persia became an issue when they reached their separate identities. After that, the Arab countries fell under the Ottoman Empire's domination and Iraq was one of these countries. There were rivalries and continuing conflicts between Persians and Ottomans. Iraq was a battleground between the two empires for a long time.

The first chapter of this study deals briefly with the historical background of the Iraq-Iran conflict, especially the modern history of this conflict. This study begins with the conflict's modern history in the sixteenth century, which began with Persians-Ottomans rivalries and wars over Iraqi soil.

In fact, the border disputes, which existed between the Ottoman Empire and the Persian Empire, continued after the creation of the independent state of Iraq.

The sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway has been the central and continuous issue of the conflict for a long time. Since the sixteenth century, many treaties have been signed to settle the conflict over the Shatt al-Arab. The last agreement which failed to solve the territorial disputes was the Algiers Agreement. This agreement was signed on March 6, 1975 by the President of Iraq and the Shah of Iran. Chapter two of this study searches deeply into the economic, strategic and historically important issue of the Shatt al-Arab. In addition, through chapter two, I will discuss the impact of the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq on the conflict between both countries. Also, it examines their relationship through Iran's policy based on military aid to the Kurdish rebellion from the Shah's era until now.

The Shatt al-Arab dispute is not the only problem between Iraq and Iran. There are other disputes as well, the dispute over the land frontier, Arabistan, and rivalry between both countries for superiority in the Gulf region. All of these subjects are covered in the third chapter of this study. Moreover, chapter three examines and explains the Israeli role in the conflict, which increased hostilities between both sides.

The subject of the final chapter deals with the issue of the war. It covers the ideological clashes between the Ba'ath Party in Iraq and the Islamic Republicans in Iran, and the course of the war of 1980.

I have relied upon Iraqi as well as Iranian data and views of impartial observers to present my study as objectively as possible.

INTRODUCTION

The Iraq-Iran War has a long history of conflict that goes back for centuries. The current war has continued for more than five years. It has brought death and suffering to hundreds of thousands of people in both countries. It has disrupted the economies of both sides. In addition, this war has increased international tensions by precipitating new alliances and rearrangement of forces in the already troubled Middle East.

There are many misconceptions as to the cause of the present day war. Western authors and professors, particularly the Americans, believe falsely, that the Iraq-Iran War is a religious war. This study shows that the basic conflict between Iraq and Iran is over the sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab Waterway, Iraqi borderlands and the Arabistan province, which was dominated by Iran in the past. The nature of the relations between Iraq and Iran, especially after the Iraqi Nationalist Revolution of the 14th of July, 1958, the rise of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party in Iraq (1968) and its national struggle with Iran for the lands and water led both countries to the present war. Between 1969 and 1975 the Iraqi-Iranian conflict focused on three major issues: 1) the continuous Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute; 2) Iran's support

for the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq; and 3) rivalry over the strategic Gulf region.

The continuous tension between the two countries increased and became more inflamed during the reign of the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Both countries' quest for influence in the Gulf, coupled with the clash in their perceived national interests in the region, have been one of the major sources of conflict in Iraqi-Iranian relations. The Shah's ambitions in the Arab Gulf and his special relationship with Israel added new dimensions to the ongoing disputes between both countries. The Iraqi-Iranian confrontation in the Gulf centered around three major issues: 1) Iran's attempts to be the only dominating power in the region; 2) Iranian claims to Bahrain; and 3) Iranian occupation of the three Arab Gulf Islands: Abu Musa, Greater and Smaller Tunbs.

The Algeria Agreement of 1975, which was signed by the President of Iraq and the Shah of Iran, was to be a peaceful ending to the long dispute over the Shatt al-Arab River. Many authors considered that the Algeria Agreement resolved the Shatt al-Arab dispute between both countries. It was seen as a good way to settle the conflict in the region. In my analysis of the information available, the opposite was the case. The Algeria Agreement of 1975 was one of the

contributing factors that led both countries to the war.

Many Western authors believe that Iran's policy under Ayatollah Khomeini toward Iraq and the small Arab Gulf states is different from the Shah's policy. My analysis will show that the Shah's policy and Khomeini's policy in the region are actually one and the same, that only different means were used to achieve the same end result.

The rise to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran led to a head-on collision with the secular, nationalist regime in Iraq. The ideological clashes between both regimes adversely affected relations between the two countries and eventually precipitated the outbreak of the war on September 22, 1980.

Due to the complexity of the subject and the paucity of published research on Iraqi-Iranian relations, I have relied upon interviews conducted with Iraqi and Iranian officials by various publications and periodicals concerning relations between the two countries, as well as on speeches and declarations by Iraqi and Iranian leaders. I have also relied upon official documents published by the two countries regarding their relations. This research has also relied on Arab and Western periodicals and on secondary sources in both Arabic and English.

CHAPTER I

ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

THE ANCIENT ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT:

The present day war between Iraq and Iran is not the first war between these countries. The history of the region shows this war is just another one of the historical conflicts between Arabs and Persians. We can trace back the roots of this conflict to 539 B.C. when Babylon fell under the domination of Cyrus, the King of Achaemenid Iran, who combined Babylon into the Persian Empire.(1)

The Sassanian Dynasty of Persia ruled Iraq for almost four centuries, between 224 A.D. and 636 A.D. The most important occurrence in the history of the two countries was the battle of "al-Qadissiyah" in 636 A.D. Muslim Arab warriors burst out of the Arabian Peninsula to conquer Iraq and destroy the Persian Empire in the battle of "al-Qadissiyah".(2) The Arab warriors continued to the Sassanian capital of "al-Madian" (a small town south of Baghdad now).(3) The Arab's victory in the battle of "al-Qadissiyah" in 636 A.D. brought the Sassanian Dynasty of Persia to an end.(4) In 1258, Mongols invaded Baghdad and put an end to Abbasid Dynasty.(5)

In fact, the outbreak of war between Iraq and Iran in September, 1980 was the result of conflicts that are rooted in history and ever-present, if at times quiescent.

Due to the lack of data, it is difficult to indicate the political, economic and other causes of the various struggles that were mentioned.

THE MODERN ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT:

Another focus of hostility is the Arab-Persian conflict that dates from the clashes between the Ottoman and Persian empires. Although their frontiers roughly approximated the present boundaries of Iraq and Iran, since the sixteenth century innumerable conferences, surveys, and treaties have failed to determine a permanent and mutually satisfactory boundary.

In fact, the Ottoman Empire played the role of the protector of the Sunnis. On the other hand, the Safawid Dynasty, which was the first native Iranian dynasty since the Sassanian Dynasty, claimed to be the protector of the Shi'ites.(6)

The Ottomans and Persians valued Iraq as a strategic asset, because it is an important route to the Arab Gulf and

it serves as a significant land bridge between East and West. Moreover, Iraq's significance is rooted in its rich and glorious past. Great civilizations, such as the Assyrian, Babylonian and Sumerian, flourished in ancient Iraq, and the choice of Baghdad as the capital of the Abbasid Muslim Dynasty conferred on the city a unique prestige and distinction which prompted the Ottomans, Persians and other foreign powers to cast a covetous eye on it.

The intensification of Ottoman-Persian rivalry manifested itself in the unceasing attempts on the part of both powers to delineate their frontiers, particularly those in the southern part of Persia and Iraq.

At this time, neither empire could achieve permanent military domination over Iraq and they were unable to resolve their conflict through armed forces. A treaty dated in 1639 at Zuhab was one of the earliest agreements between the two empires that dealt with frontier demarcation, allocation of the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, provision for Persian Shi'ites to perform the pilgrimage to shrines in Iraq, and seasonal grazing rights.(7)

In fact, Persia's goals in Iraq were: 1) to increase its influence in Iraq; 2) to maintain the security of the Basrah-Baghdad-Khanaqin trade route, through which foreign

goods and commodities flowed into Persia; and 3) to gain unlimited access to the holy Shi'ite shrines in Najaf and Karbala, particularly since the Safawid Dynasty saw itself as the protector of the Shi'ites in Iraq.(8)

In the early 1900's a new political situation began to emerge. The balance of power changed at the beginning of the nineteenth century when the British imperialist power grew in the region. The growth of British power changed the nature of the conflict between the Turks and Persians. To protect its interest in India, Britain turned the Gulf region into a British lake and moved its attention to Ottoman Iraq and Persia. Britain wanted to protect its line of commerce with India via the Middle East. Also, it wanted to extend its commercial markets in the region. Therefore, Britain wanted to have stability in the region. The Ottoman-Persian conflict and the political autonomy of many unruly tribes in the frontier zones between both empires posed problems for the progress of British imperialism in the region. At the same time, Russia was the only imperialist rival for Britain in the region. Settling the conflict between the Ottoman and Persian empires became an important policy for Britain and Russia in the Middle East. British and Russian policies were against any additional rival imperialist extension in the region. Therefore, their common interests in stabilizing the region pushed them to cooperate in settling the conflict

between the Turks and Persians. Thus, Britain and Russia cooperated to intervene in the boundary disputes between Ottoman Iraq and Persia. Britain and Russia joined in the Ottoman-Persian Commission to settle the frontier conflict.(9)

In other words, economic and political interests of Britain and Russia in the Ottoman and Persian empires and the Persian intervention in Ottoman Iraq pushed them to intervene as mediation powers to solve the Persian and Ottoman disputes. After four years of difficult negotiations, the commissioners signed the second Treaty of Erzerum on May 31, 1847.(Appendix I)(10) In fact, this treaty served the British and Russian imperialist interests by leaving the settlement of details to the delimitation commission. Britain and Russia also played the role of intermediaries.(11)

The Ottoman Empire became very weak and it was called the Sick Man of Europe. The Explanatory Note (Appendix II) connected to the second Treaty of Erzerum in 1847 showed an effective limitation to the Persians ambitions in the southern part of Ottoman Iraq. More than a century later, the Persian government stated that it did not give its representative at the 1847 negotiations any permission to sign the government's approval of the Explanatory Note.(12)

According to the Second Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, the settlement of regional disputes was not served with consideration to territorial demands. In fact, this treaty manifested the general interests of the imperialist powers in the region. At the end of the nineteenth century, Britain gained commercial domination and a strategic position in Ottoman Iraq. Different from Ottoman Iraq, in Persia the British competed with Russia to expand their influence in the region. The two imperialist powers contended in a race for great concessions to utilize Persia's natural resources. With Russian influence in the north and Britain's control over the Gulf region to the south, Persia used the rivalry for its own advantage to protect its natural resources. This situation gave the Persians extra advantages in its boundary disputes with the Ottoman Empire.(13)

The second Treaty of Erzerum in 1847, in fact, did not resolve the boundary controversy. The Tehran Protocol of 1911, which was signed by the Ottomans and Persians, (Appendix III), provided a basis for negotiations and established a boundary commission.(14) In 1913 a delegation of British, Russian, Ottoman, and Persian representatives met and delineated the boundary from the Arab Gulf to Mount Ararat and redefined navigational rights on the Shatt al-Arab River in what became known as the Constantinople Protocol of

1913 and proceedings of the commission on delimitation of frontiers of 1914. (Appendix IV) (15)

However, the First World War brought a significant change to the region. The collapse of Czarist Russia and the rise of the Socialist Revolution left Britain as the main imperialist power in the Middle East.(16) In 1917 Iraq fell under British imperialist domination and became a semi-independent state under a mandate system on August 23, 1921.(17) The tension between Iraq and Iran continued over the frontiers.

Sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab waterway was seen as one of the most important reasons which caused the present day war. This issue will be examined in detail in the following chapter. I will discuss in detail how this issue has affected the relationship between Iraq and Iran for a long time.

NOTES

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3. Seton Lloyd, Twin Rivers: A Brief History of Iraq from the Earliest Times to Present Day, (London: Oxford University Press, 1943), p.149.
4. Peter Hunseler, "The Historical Antecedents of the Shatt al-Arab Dispute" in, M.S. El-Azhary Ed., The Iran-Iraq War: An Historical, Economic and Political Analysis, (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984), p.8.
5. Nyrop, p.27.
6. Tareq Y. Ismael, Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict, (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), p.1.
7. Ibid, p.2.
8. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950: A Political, Social, and Economic History, (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp.12-13 .
9. Ismael, pp.5-6.
10. Dr. Khalid al-Izzi, The Shatt al-Arab Dispute: A Legal Study, (London: Third World Center for Research and Publishing Ltd., 3rd Edition, 1981), pp.27-28.
11. Ismael, p.6.

12. The Iranian Green Booklet: Some Facts Concerning the Dispute between Iran and Iraq over Shatt al-Arab (Tehran Ministry of Foreign Affairs, May, 1969), p.6, quoted in Ismael "Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict", pp.6-7.

13. Ismael, pp.8-9.

14. League of Nations, Official Journal, Feb., 1935, p.219, Quoted in Dr. al-Izzi, "The Shatt al-Arab Dispute: A Legal Study", p.34.

15. Dr. al-Izzi, p.34.

16. Ismael, pp.11-12.

17. al-Hadithi, "Iraq in the History", p.664.

CHAPTER II

THE SHATT al-ARAB CONFLICT

The Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute has been a continual and major source of conflict between Iraq and Iran. Compounding the dispute over the demarcation of the boundaries in the Shatt al-Arab was Iraq's historical legacy as a successor state after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. This involved a superabundance of frontier treaties between the Ottomans and Persians. Since the Treaty of Zuhab in 1639, the two empires had concluded a series of treaties to demarcate the ill-defined boundaries on the Shatt al-Arab River.

The history of Iraqi-Iranian relationship has been damaged by a perennial tension over the demarcation and conclusive control of the strategic Shatt al-Arab River. Iraq, as a successor state, sought to maintain the "status quo" along the Iraqi-Persian boundaries. Iran on the other hand, fought to change the "status quo", which it viewed as inimical to its national interests. These differences of their common boundaries led each country to view the other with increased suspicion, which further complicated and strained their relations.

There has been a tendency for the Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute to spill-over into other facets of Iraqi-Iranian relations. An example of the spill-over effects was the Iranian's intervention into the Kurdish problem in northern Iraq. The Kurdish minority has historically exploited by Iran as a vehicle to weaken central governments in Iraq. Moreover, the Shatt al-Arab crisis precipitated the start of a cold war and hostile actions between the two countries, setting in motion a cycle of action and reaction which engulfed the two states until the Algeria Agreement of 1975.

The Shatt al-Arab dispute was predetermined by the physical complexity of the waterway and the proximity of Iraqi and Iranian interests there. Despite frequent adjudication over the centuries, it has remained a constant source of friction.

The focus of this chapter is on the following issues:

1. Economic and strategic importance of the Shatt al-Arab
2. The Second Treaty of Erzerum of 1847
3. The Shatt al-Arab dispute after World War I
4. The Treaty of 1937
5. The Shatt al-Arab dispute after the Revolution of July 14th, 1958
6. The Kurdish problem and the Shatt al-Arab dispute
7. The Algeria Agreement of March 6th, 1975.

These issues will be examined in detail to see how the Shatt al-Arab dispute has seriously affected the relationship between Iraq and Iran.

ECONOMIC AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE SHATT al-ARAB RIVER:

The Shatt al-Arab River is made up of a delta in the Arab Gulf formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. It is located 47 miles north of the Port of Basrah. Its length is approximately 136 miles beginning at the town of Al-Qurnah and empties into the Arab Gulf on the coast of Iraq near the port of al-Faw. Also, the Karun River joins the Shatt al-Arab at the entrance to the city of Mohammarah to the South of Basrah. It is sufficiently deep and wide to provide passage for deep sea vessels. Its width varies from 1/4 mile to 3/4 mile according to the region. The Shatt al-Arab River forms the common Iraqi-Iranian border for approximately the last 55 miles of its length to the Gulf.

In fact, the Shatt al-Arab River and its surrounding lands have strategic and economic value for both Iraq and Iran. However, it is more important for Iraq because this is the only opening to the Gulf and open sea. In other words this river is Iraq's only life line.(1) The Shatt al-Arab waterway is referred to by President Saddam Hussein as "the

vital vein of Iraq's economy.(2)

Iraq's coastline on the Gulf is only about fifteen kilometers long. Noting Iraq's disadvantage in this regard, President Hussein has said that Iraq "has only limited outlets" to the sea while Iran, in comparison, "has a coast 2,300 kilometers long".(3) Basrah, which before the war handled many of Iraq's imports and exports other than oil, is accessible only through the narrow, vulnerable throat of the Shatt al-Arab waterway.(4) Therefore, any hostile hand can cut Iraq's throat.

S. R. Grummon described the Shatt al-Arab's strategic and economic importance for Iraq as follows:

The Shatt and the region around it have strategic and economic importance for both countries, but particularly for Iraq. The Shatt is Iraq's principal maritime window on the world, its "warm water port", to draw an analogy from Russian history. Basrah, virtually the only Iraqi commercial port of any importance... Major crude oil export pipelines lie parallel to the river, often at a close distance, and a major crude tank farm is situated at al-Faw, on the Gulf near the mouth of the river.... Basrah will remain Iraq's preeminent port and the Shatt will therefore remain Iraq's major economic artery for an indefinite period of time.(5)

As a matter of fact, for Iraq, the importance of the Shatt al-Arab River is both economic and strategic. For Iran, the Shatt al-Arab River has greater economic than strategic importance, Grummon described this as:

Iran, too, has important economic interest on the Shatt. For decades its most important port has been Khorramshahr (Mohammara), which lies at the confluence of the Shatt and Karun rivers and which also serves the southern railhead for the Trans-Iranian railway system. Despite Iran's long coastline, geography and transportation economics will continue to assure a prominent place for Khorramshahr in Iran's commercial life. Physically, it is the port closest to the major inland population centers. Commercially, transporting goods up the Gulf by ship and then loading them at the Khorramshahr railhead for the journey inland is still cheaper than off-loading at a more southerly port.

Although the Shatt has an obvious economic importance for Iran, the river does not present the country with the same strategic vulnerabilities that it does Iraq. Iran's major petroleum export facilities are not in the immediate area, and Iran has other usable Persian (Arabian) Gulf ports. (6)

The British journalist, Claudia Wright, described the significance of the strategic and economic importance for Iraq of the Shatt al-Arab River in these words:

For Iraq, the Shatt al-Arab is only one of its geographic vulnerabilities in the area. Another feature of the map is that, between Fao and Umm Qasr, Iraq has less than 50 miles of coastline on the Gulf--most of it unusable for shipping. The main port, Basrah, is nearly twice that distance away from the Gulf, up the Shatt al-Arab, and even in the best of times it has a three-month cargo bottleneck. Umm Qasr, the Iraqi naval base, lies on the border with Kuwait, and can only be reached by sea through a narrow passage between the Iraqi shore and Kuwait islands. The approach to Fao and the entrance to the Shatt estuary is commanded by Iranian artillery and naval posts on and around Abadan island.

From the Iraqi point of view, hostile hands are always potentially around the country's throat. Like Jordan at the Gulf of Aqaba, Iraq at the Persian Gulf must share its access to the sea with a non-Arab state and traditionally enemy. Iraq is also the only member of OPEC (The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) whose oil exports

cannot reach the outside world without crossing foreign territory in the north (Syria, Lebanon and Turkey), or without coming so close to Iranian territory in the south that it cannot be said to enjoy territorial security at all for its principal means of survival.(7)

Despite the standoff, both states continued to have large unsatisfied interests in the Shatt al-Arab River. Iraq believed that its own needs were acute: its usable coastline is restricted to approximately fifteen kilometers; the Shatt al-Arab is Iraq's sole means of egress to the Gulf; the port city of Basrah is some ninety kilometers from the river's mouth; the river must be dredged frequently in order to be navigable. Moreover, the importance of the waterway and its surrounding region continued to increase in proportion to the role of oil in Iraq's economy. The Iraqi government argued that Iran's 2,300-kilometer coastline made possible numerous ports, among them Chah Bahar, Bandar Abbas, and Bushire. Iran countered that it too had vital economic interests in proximity to the waterway: Kharg Island, Iran's major oil terminal and shipping facility, lay only forty eight kilometers offshore; Abadan was the site of a major oil refinery; and Khosrowabad, some twenty five kilometers south of Abadan on the Shatt al-Arab, contained a naval base.

Concerning Iraq's position in the Shatt al-Arab region, "Iraq believes that its most important economic and hence strategic assets are unprotected because Iraq lacks strategic

territorial depth".(8) (see map no.7)

THE SECOND TREATY OF ERZERUM OF 1847:

The conflict over the Shatt al-Arab River has a long history. This river has been a major source of the power struggle in this region for many centuries. The modern roots of the Shatt al-Arab issue can be traced back to 1639 when the Ottomans and Persians signed a peace treaty of Zuhab of 1639. However, this treaty did not mention the border issue in detail. The Persians claimed that the Shatt al-Arab established a natural border; the Ottoman's view was that the Arab tribes in the areas of both sides of the Shatt al-Arab composed an ethnic and historical unit which belonged to the Ottoman Empire.(9) New frontier conflicts emerged around Muhammarah [a city in Arabistan which was renamed by Iran to Khorramshahr], when the Persians controlled the city.

Encouraged by Anglo-Russian mediation, the Ottoman Empire and Persia concluded the Erzerum Treaty of 1847, which is regarded as the basis for the delineation of Ottoman-Persian joint boundaries on the Shatt al-Arab. The treaty granted Persia sovereignty over territories lying on the east bank of the river, while granting the Ottomans full sovereignty over territories lying on the west bank. Accordingly, the city of Muhammarah was allocated to Persia, in return for Persia's

relinquishing sovereignty over the city of Sulaimaniyya in northern Iraq. This territorial arrangement was enshrined in article 2 of the treaty, which stipulated that:

"The Persian Government abandons all claims to the city and province of Suleimani, and formally undertakes not to interfere with or infringe the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Government over the said province.

The Ottoman Government formally recognises the unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government over the city and the port of Muhammara, the island of Khizer, the anchorage, and the land on the eastern bank—that is to say, the left bank—of the Shatt al-Arab, which are in the possession of tribes recognised as belonging to Persia".(10) (see map no.2)

The treaty also granted Persia freedom of navigation in the Shatt al-Arab waterway, and the Persians pledged not to interfere in northern Iraq.

According to the Second Treaty of Erzerum, a commission was to be set up to delineate the Ottoman-Persian boundary. Negotiations began in 1850, but problems arose over Persia's jurisdiction over Muhammarah. The Ottomans insisted that the Persians cease to exercise sovereignty over the city until the commission had reached its final verdict.

Nonetheless, prior to the signing of the treaty, the Ottoman Empire asked the British and Russian representatives for their interpretation of certain of its provisions. In response, the Ottoman government obtained assurances from the British and Russian representatives that the Ottomans'

relinquishment of Muhammarah and the island of Khizr [Iran renamed this island Abadan] did not imply their relinquishment of other territories in that area (on the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab). These assurances were contained in the Explanatory Note (Appendix II) attached to the Second Treaty of Erzerum. In effect, this treaty placed control of the conflict into the hands of the mediating powers, particularly Britain. It gave Britain the stability necessary to consolidate its penetration of Mesopotamia (Iraq).(11)

Moreover, the Explanatory Note stipulated that Persia was not entitled to put forward any claims "in regard to the regions situated on the right bank of the Shatt al-Arab, or to the territory on the left bank belonging to Turkey, even where Persian tribes or parts of such tribes are established on the said bank or in the said territory".(12) These assurances, given to the Ottomans, led some historians to view the entire Shatt al-Arab waterway, with the exception of areas specified in the Erzerum Treaty, as falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ottoman authorities.(13) Although the Persian representative the Explanatory Note, the Persian government later repudiated it and questioned its validity and legality.(14)

The Boundary Commission, which was established by the

Treaty of Erzerum, attempted to achieve a final frontier settlement. However, the differences over the legal status of the Explanatory Note aborted the work of the commission and led to its eventual suspension.(15) On August 1912 however, Persia recognized the validity of the note as a gesture of "its sincere desire to arrive at a settlement of frontier question".(16) In addition to the harbour and anchoring rights laid down in the Erzerum Treaty, Persia's goal was to have, with Turkey, joint control over the Shatt al-Arab River.(17)

After the Anglo-Russian mediation, the Border Commission produced the Constantinople Protocol in 1913. According to article 1 of the protocol, "the frontier shall follow the course of the Shatt al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving under Ottoman sovereignty the river and all the islands therein".(18) (see map no.3) In effect, the Constantinople Protocol reasserted the Ottoman's sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab up to the Persia's side, with the exception of certain limitation at Muhammarah and Abadan.(19)

THE SHATT AL-ARAB CONFLICT AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR:

The result of the World War I caused complete unique conditions for the frontier issue along the Shatt al-Arab River. As a result of the First World War, Iraq fell under

the British mandate. As a successor state to the Ottoman Empire, Iraq inherited the frontier conflict.(20) This coincided with rise of Reza Shah as a powerful modernizing and centralizing monarch in Iran. After the destruction of the autonomous Arab Emirate of Arabistan by Reza Shah, "it became increasingly evident that Iran was unwilling to accept the contractual agreements on the Shatt al-Arab River".(21) Moreover, Reza Shah began to demand a revision of the Persian-Iraqi boundary. To that end, he withheld recognition of Iraq until 1929, and relations between the two countries were marred by a number of differences. Iran claimed that Britain and Russia together put the Iranian delegation under their pressure to give up many points of the Iranian national interests.(22)

Iran also contended that 60% of the water resources flowing into the Shatt al-Arab originated from Iranian rivers such as the Karun, the Upper and Lower Zab, the Dialeh and the Khabur.(23)

Capitalizing on King Faisal's visit to Iran in April, 1932, and the subsequent visit of Iraq's Premier Nuri al-Sa'id to Tehran, the Iranian government pressed for a revision of the boundary line to fix it in the mid-stream channel.(24) tension became increasingly evident and clashes occurred on the joint borders.(25) The ensuing deterioration

of relations between the two countries led Iraq to lodge a complaint with the League of Nations in November, 1934.(26)

THE TREATY OF 1937:

The League of Nations did not succeed in obtaining any solution to this dispute. Both Iraq and Iran agreed to withdraw their case from the League of Nations. Direct negotiations began between both countries and continued for two years.(27) Iraq signed a new treaty with Iran on July 4, 1937 (Appendix V)

The 1937 Treaty confirmed the validity of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of the Delimitation Commission of 1914 as a basis for the delimitation of the Iraqi-Iranian frontiers.(28) In return for Iran's recognition of the protocol and the outcome of the commission, Iraq ceded to Iran a four-mile anchorage area in the Shatt al-Arab.(29) According to this treaty, the border between Iraq and Iran in the Shatt al-Arab region "should follow the Thalweg (or the mid-channel of the Shatt al-Arab), for only four miles opposite the city of Abadan".(see map no.4). Moreover, in the protocol attached to the Treaty of 1937, Iran gained another concession from Iraq which stipulated that, if either of the two contractual parties issued a permit to a warship belonging to a third party in

the Shatt al-Arab, this permit would be considered as granted by the other party, provided that the other party was notified immediately.(30) However, the Shatt al-Arab River "was assigned to Iraqi jurisdiction in its whole breadth".(31)

In fact, Iran's territorial gains from the Treaty of 1937 can be attributed to the chaotic domestic situation in Iraq following the coup d'etat staged by General Bakr Sidky in November, 1936, which led to the weakening of Iraq's negotiating position.(32) Thus the Iraqi government later accused Iran of having exploited the unstable situation in Iraq, which resulted in Iran's extracting concessions in the Shatt al-Arab at Iraq's expense. Iraq maintained that, in return for these concessions, it had gained nothing except a pledge from Iran to adhere to the 1913 Protocol and the proceedings of the 1914 Delimitation Commission as the basis for settling the disputed boundaries.(33)

However, an Iranian-Iraqi Boundary Commission started its work in the Shatt al-Arab region on December 8, 1938. Both sides of the commission gave different interpretations for the treaty's articles. Iran claimed an equal control and protection of the shipping lanes in the Shatt al-Arab River. The Iraqi side viewed this claim as an Iranian attempt to use the treaty to undermine Iraq's sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab.(34) As a result of differences between both sides, the Iraqi-Iranian conflict over the boundary remained

unresolved.

In 1955 Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan joined with Britain to form the Baghdad Pact (the Middle East Treaty Organization). The Baghdad Pact members claimed that they established this organization "to forestall Soviet penetration of the region".(35) By joining the Baghdad Pact of 1955, Iraq and Iran expected that their frontier conflict would be settled.

THE SHATT AL-ARAB DISPUTE AFTER THE REVOLUTION OF JULY 14th, 1958:

With the overthrow of the monarchy and the rise of the republican regime in Iraq in 1958, Iraqi-Iranian relations underwent a steady deterioration. Symptomatic of this deterioration were the revival of the unsettled boundary question and the recurrence of military clashes along the joint border.

The Revolution of July 14th, 1958, in Iraq exacerbated Iran's fears, not only because of the downfall of the monarchical system in Iraq, but also because of the danger that Iraq might ultimately drift towards the revolutionary camp led by President Nasser of Egypt, who was championing Pan-Arabism and preaching anti-monarchical and anti-Western

slogans.(36).

Immediately after the revolution of July 14th, 1958, Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact. Moreover, the failure of the royal regime in Iraq and the rise of the nationalist revolution sent shock waves through the Iranian Royal regime and the Western bloc. Furthermore, the Shah of Iran was extremely afraid of the growth of the communist influence within the new Iraqi Government of General Abdulkarim Kasim, who was named as the leader of the revolution. The Shah believed that this might encourage and stimulate the communists in Iran.(37)

However, Iran resumed its hostile attitude towards Iraq. It reopened the old boundary disputes with Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq believed that all problems between both sides had ended with the Treaty of 1937.(38) In reality, a propaganda campaign against the new regime in Iraq was started by the Iranian Government. In an attempt to press Iran to settle the boundary question, General Kasim, the Prime Minister of Iraq, threatened to restore to Iraq the anchorage area which had been ceded to Iran as part of the 1937 Treaty.(39) Iran retorted that it would accept no principle in fixing the frontier line in the Shatt al-Arab other than that the Thalweg.(40) Iran's demand was a major departure from the tenets of the 1937 Treaty, and

subsequently rendered it inoperative.

The unsettled boundary dispute continued to fester into the 1960s, despite meetings between Iraqi and Iranian representatives in 1966, 1967 and 1968.(41) However, Iraq experienced five different regimes and three coups d'etat in less than ten years. When the Ba'ath Party came to power in Iraq in July, 1968, Iran sent an official delegation in February, 1969 to discuss the boundary question. The delegation's proposal for a new treaty to replace the 1937 Treaty was rejected by Iraq. This precipitated the total collapse of the meeting, which resulted in a further deterioration in Iraqi-Iranian relations.(42) Two months later, Iran officially abrogated the 1937 Treaty, an act which had unsettling effects on relations between the two countries. At the same time, Iran sought to increase its advantage on border adjustments through various aids to the Kurdish rebellion in the north of Iraq.(43)

THE KURDISH PROBLEM AND THE SHATT al-ARAB DISPUTE:

Iraq's delicate ethno-religious structure renders it vulnerable to outside interference aimed at inciting various ethnic and religious minorities to rise against the central government. The Kurdish minority, which is distinct both ethnically and linguistically, has historically been

exploited by Iran as a vehicle to weaken central governments in Iraq. The Iranian involvement in the Kurdish question became the most serious threat to Iraq's security and its national interest. In fact, the Kurdish rebellion was supported by Iran "as a means to settle the Shatt al-Arab frontier dispute in its favor".(44) The Iranian involvement in the Kurdish rebellion was looked upon by Iraq as a threat to its internal unity and to its security. After the success of the Revolution of July 14th, 1958, Iran began to use Iraqi-Kurdish tribes against the revolutionary regime in Iraq.

The Kurdish rebels were provided with arms and money by Iran and were encouraged to cause disruption in northern Iraq. Also, Iran promised the Kurdish rebels that it "would seriously consider any appeal from the Iraqi Kurds to unite with their Iranian brothers".(45) On July 25, 1958, Teymour Bakhtiar, the Iranian deputy premier and director of internal security, stated that if Iraqi Kurds requested union with Iran, "such a request would be considered with great interest".(46)

During the 1960s the Kurdish rebellion against the central government of Iraq became critical issue in Iraq-Iran relations. As Iraq's neighbor, Iran has been involved directly and indirectly since the start of differences

between the Kurds and the central government.

Like other facets of relations between the two countries, the Kurdish problem was an issue which assumed greater or lesser significance according to the temperature of overall relations between Tehran and Baghdad. The wide range of differences between the two countries, and especially Iraq's refusal to revise the 1937 Treaty on the Shatt al-Arab as the Shah demanded, surely have rankled him the Shah.

Thus, Iran found in the Kurdish rebellion an opportunity to engage Iraq in domestic turmoil by keeping the bulk of the Iraqi Army tied down in the north; in this way, Iran hoped to reduce Iraq's military and economic capabilities and ultimately to circumscribe its political options. To illustrate this point, it was reported that between 1961 and 1966 three of Iraq's five army divisions and a substantial portion of its air force were engaged in fighting the Kurdish rebels. (47)

In early January, 1966 there were reports of an agreements between Iranian Premier Amir Abbas Huveyda and Mulla Mustafa al-Barzani, who was the leader of the Kurdish rebels, for supplying the Kurds with arms and advisors. Other reports indicated that Iran also acted as a conduit of arms shipped to the rebels from Israel. Moreover, Iran

allowed the Kurds to use Iranian territory to attack the Iraqi Army. Generally speaking, Iran's attitude was hostile to Iraq.(48)

The rise of the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Party to power in 1968 ended the period of political instability in Iraq. However, the Kurdish rebellion in the north was inherited by the new Ba'ath Government. The Ba'ath's determination to establish a strong government caused more trouble between Iraq and Iran.(49) The Ba'ath Government attempted to put an end to the Kurdish rebellion through direct negotiation with the Kurds. These attempts were resisted by Iran through substantial increases in military aid to the rebel forces.(50) The Ba'ath Government withstood this with a military campaign against the Kurdish rebels. Thus, Iraq entered into a situation similar to the civil war.

After Iran's abrogation of the 1937 Treaty in 1969, relations between both countries became worse and a war of propaganda was started by both sides. Iran claimed that large numbers of Iranians, who were living in Iraq, were mistreated by Iraqi authorities. Iraq denied this and declared that large numbers were deported out of Iraq.(51) Furthermore, Iraq allowed some of the Iranian opposition leaders to use Iraq as a base against the Shah's regime. Some of the above referenced opposition leaders were General

Teymour Bakhtiar, the former chief of secret police in Iran, and the Ayatollah Khomeini himself.(52)

However, the war between the Kurdish rebels, backed by Iranian aid, and the Iraqi Army in northern Iraq was a serious problem for the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government believed that there were two ways to solve the Kurdish problem; either it "could give way to the Kurdish rebels or it could give in to Iran".(53) The Iraqi Government chose the first way and signed the March 11, 1970 Manifesto with the leader of the rebels. Indeed, Iranian aid for the rebels increased after the signing of the March Manifesto. Iran took advantage of the differences that arose between the Iraqi Government and the leadership of the Kurdish rebellion. However, the war between the Iraqi Army and the rebels was inflamed again by massive Iranian involvement in the Kurdish question. The rebels' leadership believed that only Iran's support could force the Iraqi Government to agree with its demands.(54)

The Shah of Iran asked President Nixon and his Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger to join him in supporting the Kurdish rebels. The Ba'ath Government viewed the Shah's aid to the rebels as a hostile alliance among Iran, the U.S. and Israel.(55) According to Al-Ahad Magazine, the first U.S. aid to the Kurdish rebels had occurred in August, 1969.

General Anthony Devery Hunter, an American officer working with the CENTO, met al-Barzani in his headquarter in northern Iraq and signed a secret agreement. In accordance with this agreement, the U.S. gave \$14 million to Mustafa al-Barzani.(56)

Superpower involvement further propelled the conflict between Iraq and Iran onto a higher plateau of intransigence. Pressed beyond its capacity by its rivalry with Iran, by the need to establish its legitimacy among disparate groups, and by the anticipated nationalization of Iraq's oil industry, the Ba'ath Government sent a delegation to Moscow in July, 1970 to seek weapons. In April, 1972 Iraq signed a fifteen-year treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger visited Tehran at the end of the following month and discussed the Shah's future assistance to the Kurdish rebels.(57)

In fact, the Kurdish rebellion was used as a Trojan Horse by the Shah of Iran to force the Iraqi Government to accept the "Thalweg" or median line as a border line between the two countries in the Shatt al-Arab region. A report was made by congressional investigators about the U.S. involvement in the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq. This report was called the Pike House Committee Report, which included a report made by the CIA chief-of-station in Tehran in 1972. This report

stated:

"The CIA had early information which suggested that our ally (the Shah) would abandon the (Kurds) the minute he came to an agreement with his enemy over the border dispute".(58)

In short, the Kurdish episode showed that the convergence of Iranian, American and Israeli interests in weakening the Iraqi Government led them to use the Kurds as a pawn in the Iraqi-Iranian dispute. Once the Kurds had outlived their usefulness, the Iranians abandoned and sacrificed them. This fact was realized belatedly by al-Barzani when he complained bitterly that "we are bitter, because we were broken down not by our enemies but by our friends".(59)

THE ALGERIA AGREEMENT OF 1975:

The Algeria Agreement of March 6th, 1975, was a watershed and marked a significant turning-point in Iraqi-Iranian relations. One of the major factors behind this agreement was the conviction of both Iraq and Iran that a full-scale war must be avoided at all costs.

While the frontier clashes between Iraqi and Iranian troops reoccurred from 1971 to 1974, the Iraqi Army was entangled in destructive war with the Kurdish rebels, who were backed by Iran. In December 1974, and January 1975, the fighting increased when the Iraqi Army attempted to push the

Kurdish rebel forces from the strip they still controlled near the border with Iran. Iraq's resumption of the war against the Kurdish rebels and its determination to suppress the rebellion were matched by a deeper Iranian involvement in the Kurdish issue and wider clashes along the Iraqi-Iranian border.

Iran's increased support for the Kurdish rebels was evident when the Iranians used sophisticated surface-to-air Hawk missiles against Iraqi planes flying within Iraqi airspace in northern Iraq. Two Iraqi warplanes were shot down inside Iraqi territory on December 14 and 15, 1974.(60) The 130mm guns were used by Iranian forces to shell the northern Iraq border towns, especially the town of Qalat Dizah. In fact, the Shah's intervention discouraged Iraqi troops from destroying the Kurdish rebel forces and allowed them to attack major northern Iraqi cities, especially the city of Irbil, by heavy artillery.(see map no.5)

In January, 1975 Iran increased its aid to the Kurds by positioning two regiments of uniformed troops inside the Iraqi border. Iranian combat units armed with 175mm artillery and Hawk missiles began to provide cover for the Kurdish rebels, a development which subsequently led to direct military engagements between Iranian troops and the Iraqi Army.(61)

In fact, the Kurdish insurgency had been a financial and political drain, inhibiting flexibility in both domestic and foreign affairs. Until an agreement could be reached, the Ba'ath Government would continue to be distracted from its program of domestic development, which was linked to the long-term stability of the Ba'ath Party in Iraq.

As a matter of fact, the war in northern Iraq caused thousands of casualties and cost over \$2.5 million daily.(62)

Moreover, the Iraqi Army was hardly in a position to withstand Iranian pressures. Iraqi military and economic abilities were exhausted by the Kurdish rebellion, particularly in the face of the Shah's military aid to the rebels and the continuous clashes on the border.(63)

In addition to the above mentioned situation, the most cogent reason propelling the settlement with Iran was that by mid-1975 the Soviet Union had so curtailed its arms shipments that Iraq's military stores were being rapidly depleted. President Hussein stated in 1980 that the Algeria initiative had come at a time when "there were only three heavy missiles left in the air force and very few artillery shells".(64) This period, characterized by the slowing of Soviet aid and by Iranian and American support of the Kurdish rebels, had a profound effect on the Ba'ath leadership. Many came to the

belief that heavy political or military dependence on a superpower reduced Iraq's maneuverability and jeopardized the security of the state. The Algeria Agreement of 1975 thus presented Iraq with diverse and sorely needed policy options.

As a matter of fact, the possibility of a large-scale Iraqi-Iranian war was forestalled when Algerian mediation efforts succeeded in achieving a significant diplomatic breakthrough on March 6, 1975, which ended the Shah's aid to the Kurds, resulting in the collapse of the Kurdish rebellion. President Boumedienne of Algeria played a crucial role during the OPEC's meeting at Algeria in effecting a reconciliation between the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi President. An agreement designed to reach a final settlement of all problems between Iraq and Iran was concluded on March 6, 1975 (Appendix VI).

The Algeria Agreement provided for the following:

1. Definite demarcation of their land frontiers on the basis of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and minutes of the Frontier Demarcation Commission of 1914.

2. Demarcation of river frontier according to the Thalweg line, i.e. the median line in mid-channel.

3. The re-establishment of mutual security and confidence along their joint border and an undertaking to conduct strict and effective control along the joint borders to put a final end to all subversive infiltration from either side.

4. The two parties also agreed on considering the aforementioned arrangements as indivisible elements for a comprehensive settlement and consequently the violation of any of the provisions

will naturally contradict the spirit of the Algeria Agreement; the two parties will remain in constant contact with President Houari Boumedienne who will, when necessary, offer Algeria's brotherly assistance for the implementation of these decisions.(65)

In accordance with this treaty, Iran would stop its aid to the Kurdish rebels. Iraq agreed to stop the Cold War and any interference in each others internal affairs. The Iraqi lands, which were occupied by Iran in the past, were to be returned to Iraq. Also, Iraq agreed that the border line between the two countries in the Shatt al-Arab region should follow the Thalweg or the mid-channel of the river.(66) (see Map no.6)

On June 13, 1975, representatives of the two countries signed an additional agreement, based on the Algeria Communique, known as the Treaty of International Boundaries and Good Neighborliness (Appendix VII). This treaty contained three protocols and annexes. It was designed to settle dispute over the land and riverine boundaries, territorial waters, and internal security issues. The basic agreement involved one major exchange. In return for Iraq's acceptance of the Thalweg as the southern boundry with Iran rather than the eastern bank of the Shatt al-Arab River, each country agreed to the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of the other country. It was an integral agreement: violation of one part of the treaty invalidated

it entirely. This meant, in this instance, that Iran would cease to aid the Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq. In accordance with this treaty, Iran was to return Iraqi land in the middle sector, which Iran had not done while the Thalweg line was applied to the Shatt al-Arab River.(67)

Iraq has attributed its territorial concessions to the Shah in March, 1975 to the failure of the Arab states to support Iraq during the Iraqi-Iranian military confrontation, and to the failure of the Soviet Union to honour its military commitments to Iraq. Although Iraq made territorial concessions to Iran in the Shatt al-Arab, Iraq gained some portions of territory on the land boundaries with Iran, in accordance with the 1913 Constantinople Protocol.(68) Moreover, Iraq, which was already disturbed at Iran's massive military build-up in the Gulf, saw the Algeria Agreement as an important vehicle for a reduction of the growing arms race in the Gulf region.(69)

Regardless of the fact that the Algeria Agreement was necessary to Iraq's security and unity, in the long term Iran attained more. Edith and E. Francis Penrose stated this fact and said:

For the Shah it opened a prospect of strengthening the Iranian hold on the Gulf and safeguarding the single large-scale outlet for Iranian oil exports.(70)

In fact, Iran gained immediate advantage when the Algeria Agreement of 1975 became effective. Iran became a partner in the sovereignty over the greater part of the Shatt al-Arab River, based on the rule of the Thalweg line. It is very clear that Iraq's difficult position in the Kurdish area was the most important reason for Iraq to sign the Algeria Agreement. In his press conference, the Iraqi Defence Minister stated this fact as follows:

We would not have agreed to the Algeria Agreement if we had had the choice. We accepted the agreement because local Arab and international factors forced us to accept the de facto situation, which was at the time a step toward a better stage, to a position beyond the 1975 agreement on the land borders and the Shatt al-Arab.(71)

In spite of the Shah's withdrawal of his support for the Kurdish rebellion, Iran's intervention in the Kurdish problem in Iraq was not over. Jawad stated his analysis of this fact, after referring to the Iraqi policy concerning the Algeria Agreement of 1975, he continued:

This policy was successful in the sense that Iran withdrew support from the Kurds after the Algeria Agreement in 1975, and the Kurdish revolt was crushed.

However, this did not mean that Iranian involvement in or exploitation of the Kurdish question was over. The rapprochement did not put an end to all the disputes between the two countries, and the Kurdish discontent with the Iraqi government could always be used to Iran's advantage.(72)

As a result of the above mentioned case, Iraq declared that the new regime in Iran (Ayatollah Khomeini regime),

violated the internal security protocol attached to the Algeria Agreement. The Iraqi Defence Minister declared in his press conference as follows:

Two months after the new regime came to power, the Iranian authorities instigated agent Barzani and his sons—who fought the Iraqi authorities for seven years to disrupt internal security and whose case was covered by the Algeria Agreement in its third protocol on internal security—and began supplying these groups with weapons, providing them financial assistance and training them on its territories. (73)

In summary, the Shatt al-Arab River is unique in the Middle East region. No other border has a record so long and so emotional. The Shatt al-Arab dispute is serious enough to induce either party to go to war. The legacy of centuries, the vital interest, and the national pride involved all ensure its importance. In accordance with the Second Treaty of Erzerum of 1847, the Constantinople Protocols of 1913 & 1914 and the Treaty of 1937, the Shatt al-Arab is not an international river. It is a national river under Iraq's sovereignty. Iraq expressed its sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab River except for two small positions opposite Abadan and Mohammarah.

It was emphasized that no progress has been made on the resolution of the differences between the two countries that revolve around their mutual frontier in the Shatt al-Arab area. Many mediation efforts failed to put an end to the

Iraq-Iran dispute over the Shatt al-Arab. The failure of these mediation efforts attests to: 1) the internal technical and legal complexity of the Shatt al-Arab boundary dispute; and 2) the difficulty of isolating the Shatt al-Arab issue from the intricate web of Iraqi-Iranian relations and the impossibility of addressing the issue in isolation from other disputed questions.

Another complicating factor which militated against a settlement of the Shatt al-Arab boundary was Iran's support for the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq.

The escalation of tension and clashes along the borders led Iraq increasingly to polarize the Iraqi-Iranian conflict into an Arab-Iranian one. The prospect of a full-fledged war between the two countries was only averted when they signed the Algeria Agreement in March, 1975. This ended the Shah's aid to the Kurds.

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CHAPTER III

OTHER MAJOR AREAS OF THE CONFLICT

The focus of this chapter is on the following:

Land Frontier Dispute

Arabistan

Rivalry Over the Arabian Gulf

Iran's Special Relationship with Israel

LAND FRONTIER DISPUTE:

Iraq's present boundaries do not correspond to the entire geographic unit that is primarily defined by the Tigris-Euphrates river systems, one-quarter of which lies outside Iraq. The half millennium during which the present state of Iraq gradually evolved was a history of numerous negotiations, memoranda, mapmaking, lost records, procrastination, contradictory evidence, and little accord.

Iraq inherited 1,472 kilometers of old Ottoman-Persian frontier, which extended some 1,888 kilometers from the Gulf to Mount Ararat. Approximately 700 of the 1,472 kilometers pass through the Kurdish area in the north.(1) The complicated negotiations that defined this Ottoman-Persian

frontier were clouded by intrigue, the extent of which may only be surmised.

The earliest surviving document relative to the boundary settlement is dated at Zuhab in 1639, but was itself preceded by negotiations known to have occurred about one hundred years previously. The Zuhab Treaty was followed by numerous attempts at further adjustments, most important in 1746 (Treaty of Kurdan), 1823 and 1847 (Erzerum), 1911 (Tehran), and 1913 (Constantinople). All of these agreements were accompanied by the efforts of numerous commissions and cartographers, and interspersed with border strikes and general unrest.(2)

In fact, the frontier problem has been reconsidered twice since 1914. First, between the new Turkish Republic and Persia, and second, between Persia and the new Kingdom of Iraq.(3) However, in 1913-1914 when the Iraqi-Iranian frontiers were fixed, it was assumed that no dispute should arise between the two countries on the border question. Despite that, and shortly after Iraq gained its independence in 1932, Iran committed a number of violations on Iraqi territory. Iran, also declared its non-adherence to the border agreements between the two states. Concerning the land frontier, Iran denied the validity of the Second Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 and the Protocol of Constantinople of

1913, as well as the minutes of the Border Demarcation Committee of 1913-1914.(4)

Concerning the land frontier problem, Iraq requested the Council of the League of Nations to deal with this problem. On January 14, 1935, Nouri al-Said, the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister, at that time, presented Iraq's case and stated that:

the difficulties stemmed from Persian interference with navigation on the Shatt al-Arab, establishment of police posts and patrols on Iraqi territory, unlawful claims to a small strip of territory called Sarkoshk, and the damming of the Gunjan Cham River".(5)

On the other hand, the Iranian Foreign Minister rejected the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847 and the Protocol of 1913.

Although geographically confined, the central sector of the Iraq-Iran border issue became inextricably linked with the Shatt al-Arab and Kurdish issues. The contested region is some 210 kilometers long, bounded by Khanaqin and Qasr-e-Shirin in the north and Badra and Mahran in the Middle, varying in width from 3 to 16 kilometers. Sporadic shooting incidents occurred in April 1972 and again from December, 1973 to February, 1974. After one confrontation in which some eighty-one Iranians and twenty-four Iraqis sustained injuries, half of them resulting in death, Iraq appealed to the UN Security Council, which arranged a

ceasefire on March 17, 1974.(6) After visiting both countries, a UN delimitation commission stated in its report accordingly:

The 1914 border line tracing of the Khanaqin-Badra/Qasr-e-Shirin-Mahran sector seems to favour Iraq's interpretation, although again not in every respect.

In view of these observations, it would seem important to delimit and demarcate the border line. We were assured by both sides that neither, in principle, had territorial claims along the land frontier; both governments, in fact, indicated that they would stand by the findings of a new joint delimitation commission, which could also settle at the same time the question of the other. It would appear that this question should be given priority in the conversations on bilateral issues.(7) (see Maps no.8 & 9)

In accordance with the Algeria Agreement of 1975, the areas of "Zain Alqaws" and "Saif Sa'ad" "were to be returned to Iraq, because they were Iraqi lands that had been forcibly annexed by Iran".(8) However, Iraq waited for the return of its land areas that were mentioned above, "because that required land surveys and the establishment of points for new boundaries. This slow process continued until the fall of the Shah".(9) The Iraqi Government realized the difficulties and problems that overwhelmed the new regime of Iran, therefore, it did not immediately demand the Iraqi lands. The Khomeini regime refused to return the Iraqi lands in accordance with the Algeria Agreement of 1975.(10) The first president of the new regime in Iran agreed that the former Shah of Iran did not honor the Algeria Agreement. However, he refused to negotiate the border dispute and claimed that:

"between Moslem states there is no frontier so the problem does not lie there".(11) He also said that "the dispute over borders among Islamic countries is trivial".(12)

In conclusion, the land frontier dispute, at this point in time is still unsettled. The Iranian refusal was one of the major issues that led to the present war.

ARABISTAN:

One of the principle areas of conflict between Iraq and Iran is the Arab territory of Arabistan. This area is known in Arabic as "Ahwas", and it is located southeast of Iraq. Arabistan's west boundary reaches Iraq's territory of Missan and Basrah including the Shatt al-Arab River. On the north and east of Arabistan, the chain of Zagros mountains is a natural boundary, which separates it from Iran. Arabistan's southern boundary is the Arab Gulf.(13) (see Map no.10)

Arabistan's population is approximately three and one half million, comprised of Arabic tribes, which came in waves from the Arabian Peninsula before and after the rising of Islam. In fact, the presence of the Arab tribes in this region is hence multi-secular and dates back well before Jesus Christ.(14) After the Arabic Tribe of Bani Tamim, which came to look for water, other Arabic tribes settled in

Arabistan before and after the emergence of Islam. Maxime Rodinson described the supremacy of the nomadic Arab tribes over the Arabistan region and said:

The Arab penetration is ancient. It certainly must have begun before Islam, notably when the Arab tribes were occupying a great part of Mesopotamia ... in the 6th century B.C.(15)

The surface area of Arabistan is approximately 71,430 sq. miles or 263 miles long and 238 miles wide. Arabistan, is mainly inhabited by Arabs, and the Arabic culture and custom is dominant. Most of the historians who specialized in ancient history identify with Arabistan's Arabic character.(16)

In fact, the eastern bank of the Shatt al-Arab River and the province of Arabistan have been purely Arab areas since ancient times. The population has been overwhelmingly Arab, and its language is Arabic. The province of Arabistan has been ruled by Arab dynasties, such as Mousha'shi'ins, the Bani Ka'ab, and finally the Emirate of Muhammarah.(see Map no.11)

The intractable attempts to conquer the province of Arabistan by either the Persians or Ottomans, and its strategic location vis-a-vis Iraq and Gulf commerce was highlighted by the rise of the Ka'ab tribe in the eighteenth century. Between 1727 and 1763 the Persians as well as the

Ottomans launched unsuccessful campaigns to dominate the Bani-Ka'ab tribe. The Arabistan's effective independence was ended by the Ottomans with British assistance in 1763.(17) When the oil was discovered in the Arabistan region, Britain recognized the autonomy of Muhammarah in 1902 and signed an agreement of military assistance with Sheikh Kaza'al, the Sheikh of Muhammarah, in 1905.(18) The British promised the Sheikh of Muhammarah military assistance against Persia in exchange for a treaty with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the alliance between Britain and Reza Khan, the Shah of Iran, was largely exercised vis-a-vis the Arabistan province. The oil, which was discovered in Arabistan, made this province a very strategic area to the British and a most valuable possession for Iran. Therefore, Britain withdrew its support of Arabistan's autonomy.(19)

Muhammarah's autonomy came to an end in 1925, when Reza Shah destroyed the power of Sheikh Khaza'al of Arabistan. Britain's failure to resist Reza Shah's destruction of Arabistan autonomy is attributed to the British Government's desire for a highly centralized government in Iran to serve and further British interests.(20) Some historians argue that Reza Shah's destruction of Arabistan emboldened him to escalate his demands for control of the Shatt al-Arab

River.(21) Arabistan's name was changed by the Shah to Khuzistan in 1925.(22)

After Iraq's independence, her relationship with Iran remained tense over Arabistan. Tawfiq al-Suwaidi, the first Iraqi ambassador in Iran, identified the issue of Arabistan with the Iraqi-Iranian relationship during 1931-1934, and he stated:

There were other issues which were no less problematic. The conditions of the Arabs in Khuzistan (Arabistan) caused complaints and communications between the two governments. The Iranian government believed that the Arabs of Khuzistan were encouraged by the Iraqi government to rebel. At the same time, the Iraqi government believed that a harsh oppression was exercised by Iran against the Arabs of Khuzistan. This policy resulted in a number of uprisings which forced the Arabs of Arabistan to seek refuge in Iraq. The Iraqi government between the years 1932-1934 thought of asking Iran to allow those people (of Arabistan) to move into Iraq if they wished, where they would be given land in Iraq to utilize and would be able to enjoy their language and traditions. This appeared to be impossible for no member of the Iranian government was willing to even broach the topic with the Shah.(23)

However, the relationship between Iraq and Iran became more inflamed since the emergence of the Arab Socialist regime in Iraq and the growing Arab nationalist movement in Arabistan. The population of Arabistan was considered by the Arab Ba'ath Socialist Government in Iraq as part of the Arab nation. In fact, the province of Arabistan contains almost all of Iran's oil.(24) Several military bases and barracks

were built in the province of Arabistan. However, the Arab people of the region never stopped claiming their right to liberty. They demanded autonomy, "official recognition of the use of the Arabic Language along with the Persian Language, a greater place for local Arabs in government, and economic programs for the Arabs, many of whom live in exceptionally depressed conditions. Though many Arabs work in the oil industry, agribusiness, and elsewhere, most hold lower-paying jobs than non-Arabs".(25) In fact, the Arab nationalist movement was effectively suppressed by the Shahs of Iran, especially the former Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Therefore, -as N. R. Keddie wrote- "the Arab Nationalist Movement has been encouraged by Arabs outside Iran, especially by Iraqis".(26) Iraq showed itself to be one of the Arab countries that was most attentive to the cause of the province of Arabistan, due to its geographical and historical ties with this province.

Although Iraq had made vague claims to Arabistan in the past, it had done so only spasmodically and even half-heartedly. After Iran's abrogation of the 1937 Treaty, Iraq took the initiative. Iraq's response to Iran's abrogation of this treaty was to declare the treaty valid and binding on both sides. Furthermore, to put Iran on the defensive, Iraq shifted its strategy to the offensive by reviving the issue of Arabistan. This shift was evident in

April, 1969, when the Iraqi Deputy Premier and Interior Minister, General Salih Mahdi Amash, stated that there were no differences between Iraq and Iran over the Shatt al-Arab because it was Iraqi territory. However, the "differences should have been over Arabistan, which is Iraqi territory annexed to Iran during the foreign mandate and which is called Ahvaz against the will of the Iraqi people.(27)

It is interesting to observe that the issue of Arabistan and its manipulation by Iraq depended on the nature of relations between Iraq and Iran. The more relations between the two sides deteriorated, the more acute the issue became. Thus, as a counter-measure against Iran's abrogation of the 1937 Treaty, the Ba'ath Government reactivated the Arabistan issue by announcing the formation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Arabistan in June, 1969.(28)

The Arabistanians' struggle grew more and more to achieve the end of the Shah's regime. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979 in Iran, the Arab people of Arabistan, expected to be afforded more autonomy, but they were disappointed. The new regime in Iran refused to permit them any of their demands. Therefore, "Arab protests occurred and sabotage of oil pipe-lines was blamed on Arab Nationalists".(29) The Ayatollah Khakhali, President of the Revolution Courts in Iran, claimed during his visit to Bahrain, that Iraq and

other Gulf countries are sending weapons to Arabistan and to Muhammarah.(30)

On the other hand, Shibli al-Aissami, the Assistant Secretary of the National Command of the Ba'ath Party declared in April, 1979:

The important thing is that Arabistan should have autonomy and self-government, democracy and freedom. The Iranians now say there is no need for nationality rights because in Islam all is one, but this is a formalist answer.(31)

In fact, the Iranian Government did everything possible to make the Shatt al-Arab River the common property of Iran and Iraq together. Therefore, the occupation of Arabistan since 1925 was a step to achieve her goal. This occupation allowed Iran to take control of a part of the Shatt al-Arab River.

In short, Arabistan (Khuzistan) plays a different role in the hostilities between both countries. For Baghdad, two potential gains stand out during the Iraqi initiative attack on Arabistan province in 1980. First, Arabistan, whose population has historically been Arabs, appears to the Ba'ath Party as part of the Arab Nation. It would be a supreme act of Pan-Arabism to win this land for the Arabs. Second, control of Arabistan would end Iraq's vexing lack of Arabian Gulf shoreline. These possible advantages to Iraq are so

great that probably they must have entered into Iraq's calculations and added importantly to other reasons for going to war in 1980.

RIVALRY OVER THE ARABIAN GULF

Britain's withdrawal from the Arabian Gulf area in 1971, injected an element of confusion and uncertainty into a highly strategic area. The removal of the British protective umbrella led to fears over the resultant military and political vacuum in the Gulf, and its impact on the region's political stability. The issue of political stability in the area was complicated by the existence of many small, wealthy states characterized by tenuous political and institutional structures in a region fraught with tribal, territorial, dynastic and historical disputes.

The issues that are likely to cause disputes between Iraq and Iran are the Iranian claims to Bahrain, the Iranian occupation of the three Arab Islands: Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Iraq's demands on Iran to return these three Arab Islands to their owner, the United Arab Emirates, is another source of the continuing conflict. Also, the rivalries between these two countries to be the dominating power in the Gulf region has increased the tensions between them.

a. Iranian Claim to Bahrain:

Another source of conflict in Iraqi-Iranian relations in the Gulf centred on what the Arabs perceived as Iran's irredentism in the area, as manifested in its claim to Bahrain. Iran's claim to Bahrain fuelled Arab suspicions of its intentions in the region and also served as a catalyst for sharpening Arab-Iranian polarization in the area. Hence the various Arab regimes in the Gulf, notwithstanding their ideological and political differences, were united in resisting Iran's claims to Bahrain. Relations between Iraq and Iran were strained by the Iranian's "historical" claim to Bahrain.

Bahrain is comprised of a group of islands located midway down the Arab Gulf approximately 18 miles from the east coast of Saudi Arabia. (see Map no. 12) The population of Bahrain is approximately 360,000 and it consists of thirty three islands that total 258 square miles. (32)

After many centuries of independence, Bahrain was occupied by the Portugese from 1521 to 1602. Iran's ties to Bahrain began in 1602 when the Persians expelled the Portugese occupiers. The Persian's occupation of Bahrain continued from 1602 to 1783. Under the native tribe of Utubi, the Arabs were able to end the Persian occupation in

1783.(33) In fact, even after the Utubi tribe forced the Iranian forces out of Bahrain, Iran refused to relinquish claim to these islands based on their occupation from 1602 to 1783. Through a special relationship between the Sheikh of Bahrain and Britain, the Bahrain Islands fell under British domination in 1880. The British imperialist domination of Bahrain kept it from falling under Iran's control. Oil was discovered in 1932 and first exported in 1934, and that gave Bahrain economical importance in addition to its strategic location in the Arab Gulf.(34)

For the interest of Iran, the Shah attempted to settle the Bahrain Islands issue before the British withdrawal from the Gulf region. Therefore, secret negotiations took place between Tehran, New York, London, and Bahrain. After these negotiations, the Bahrain issue was brought to the United Nations.(35) Finally, when Bahrain became independent on August 14, 1971, Iran was the first country to recognize its sovereignty only one hour after the announcement of independence.(36)

In fact, the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, relinquished his claims to Bahrain as a result of the bargain with Britain to allow Iran to occupy the three Arab Islands in the Gulf: Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs. Anthony H. Cordesman, who has served as a U. S. government official in Iran stated:

The Shah also gave up Iran's claim to Bahrain in

May, 1970, although this may have been part of a complex bargain with Britain to allow him to seize several strategic islands and offshore oil fields in the Gulf. In any case, the Shah confined his actions to a massive military buildup, to deploying an Iranian military presence on Qu'oin Islands in the Strait of Hormuz, and to seizing the Abu Musa and Tumb islands in the Gulf.(37)

However, the ruler of Iran is unimportant because this country's ambitions in the Arab lands in the Gulf region have not changed for hundreds of years. As a matter of fact this still remains a constant issue. The Iranian claim to the Bahrain Islands re-emerged after the fall of the Shah of Iran and the emergence of the Islamic Republic. For example, on April 16, 1980, Sadeqh Rouhani, one of the Iranian Islamic Leaders of the new regime in Iran declared as follows:

Bahrain is an integral part of the Iranian territory. According to the new constitution of Iran, Bahrain constitutes the fourteenth department of Iran. In the Algeria Agreement the dethroned Shah made too many territorial concessions to Iraq. Today, we feel there is a need to elucidate Iran's position on Bahrain due to the claims formulated by certain Arab countries, notably Iraq, regarding the three islands in the Gulf.(38)

Moverover, the Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Sadeqh Ghotbzadeh declared during an interview with Radio Monte-Carlo on April 30, 1980 that "all the countries in the Gulf are historically a part of Iranian territory".(39)

Concerning the Iranian claims to Bahrain, in fact, there is no difference between the Shah's expansionist policy and the ambitions of the new Islamic regime under Ayatollah

Khomeini. However, a new element was added to the historical claim to Bahrain by the Iranian new regime. This new element is the connection between the Shi'ite population of the two countries.(40) Different methods were attempted by Iran. The Bahrainian Government announced in December, 1981, that seventy three persons were arrested after an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow the Bahrainian Government. It also announced that these individuals were trained in Iran.(41)

b. Iranian Occupation of the three Arab Islands:

The Shah's occupation of the three strategic Arab Islands is another element which has sharpened hostility between Iraq and Iran. More importantly, Iran's use of military force to seize the islands lent credence to Iraq's warnings of the Shah's expansionist ambitions in the Gulf region. By the same token, Iran's resort to force exacerbated Arab fears and apprehensions about the Shah's military build-up.

The importance of the strategic location of these three islands is very clear. Abu Musa and the Tunbs Islands are located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz. They command the Strait of Hormuz, which connects the Arab Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and Arabian Sea, providing a channel through which the Gulf oil is shipped. Due to their closeness to the Strait of Hormuz, Abu Musa, Greater and Lesser Tunbs Islands

hold a significant interest. In an article the French Newspaper, Le Monde, stated:

Back-to-back with coasts of the Emirates, these three islands constitute observation posts for the coastline of the Gulf countries: United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran.(42) (see Map no.13)

From a strategic point of view, any power dominating these three islands strengthens its position in the Strait of Hormuz. Also, it controls the entire Gulf region militarily, politically and commercially. These three islands are very rich in minerals. They may have oil under or close to them. In fact, discoveries of oil have been made in Abu Musa's territorial waters, but go untapped due to competition between British and American oil companies.(43)

Most researchers specializing in ancient history who visited the Gulf region believe that Abu Musa Island rightly belongs to the Sheikhdom of Sharjah. Also, they believe that the two Tunbs Islands belong to the Sheikhdom of Ras al-Khaimah. These two sheikhdoms became members of the United Arab Emirates in 1971.(44)

The Iranian policy towards the sheikhdoms took the form of threats during 1970 and 1971. For example, in February, 1971, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, affirmed that "unlike the dispute over Bahrain, Iran would be prepared to resort to force to re-establish its authority over the

islands."(45) Moreover, the Shah declared on June 24, 1971, that the three Gulf islands "had been grabbed some eighty years ago at a time when Iran had no central government.... Otherwise we have no alternative but to take the islands by force."(46) Thus, the Iranian forces landed on these three islands and occupied them on the same day of the British withdrawal on November 30, 1971.(47)

The Iranians argued that their occupation of the three islands was committed to stabilizing the region and would ensure freedom of navigation in the Gulf.(48) Iran added that "its objective was to defend the security of the Gulf against the entry of foreign powers".(49) In addition, the prospect for major discovery of oil in these islands is very promising; this would be of considerable economic value to Iran.(50)

The Iraqi Government described the occupation as "a preliminary step to the creation of a new Palestine in the Arab Gulf".(51) Moreover, Iraq began to warn that Iran's military build-up was a tool "to support the expansionist policy of Iran, to threaten every neighbouring country that resists that policy.., and to impose a self-proclaimed hegemony over the area".(52) In addition, the Iraqis declared angrily that they "will take any and every measure to preserve Iraq's rights against Iranian regional

expansionism".(53) In return, the Iranian Government warned "all outsiders against intervening" and added that its occupation is "a purely internal move".(54) At this juncture, Iraqi-Iranian relations reached a new low. In fact, the Iranian occupation of the three islands threaten Iraq's lifeline from both sides of the Gulf.

The Shah's fall, however, presented increased tensions between Baghdad and Tehran. The islands question was reopened by the Iraqi Government. On behalf of the owner of the three islands, the United Arab Emirates, Dr. Sa'adoun Hammadi, the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister, sent a letter to the Secretary General of the United Nations on April 6, 1980. He demanded Iran's withdrawal from these islands and stated that Iraq "does not recognize Iran's ownership of these islands".(55)

However, the Iranian reaction was extremely sharp. Sadeqh Ghotbzadeh, the Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister, declared that "we will not give up one inch of our sacred country on which stands the flag of Islam and Iran".(56) He added, "if everybody were to claim any place on historic excuses, the Mada'en (a city in Iraq which was the capital city of the Persians during the Sassanian Dynasty) and Baghdad should be ours".(57) In his warning to the Arab countries, Ghotbzadeh, said that "if the Arab states do not

stop their provocations, we will repulse them with all means and with all our power."(58)

Hostilities have increased between Iraq and Iran since Iraq demanded the immediate retreat of Iranian forces from the three islands. One of Iraq's demands to end the conflict with Iran was the return of the islands to their owner. Concerning these demands, the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, declared that "the Shah occupied three Arab islands in the Gulf. If the revolution is an Islamic one, then why have they not returned the islands to their Arab owners?"(59)

Concerning the occupation of the three Arab islands, the Khomeini regime's policy is shown to be the same as the Shah's policy. As per a speech made by the President of Iraq on September 17, 1980, he said:

We had sincerely hoped that Khomeini would be different from the Shah in his positions on our national and pan-Arab causes, particularly the cause of the occupied Arab territories. We gave him enough time to prove whether he was really different from the Shah or not. Yet he and those ruling with him in Iran these days proved that they are no different from the Shah in their expansionist ambitions and in their racist stands toward the Arabs. They have unjustly maintained all the Iraqi territories which the Shah occupied and maintained the three Arab islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa.(60)

However, the leaders of the new regime in Iran claimed that their viewpoint was quite different from the Shah's.(61)

In summary, the continuation of Iranian's ambitious policy is very obvious. The former Shah of Iran justified his occupation of the islands by arguing that if these islands fell under "foreign powers" which he meant the Soviet Union, they would strategically threaten Iran's security. Shown in a similar way, the Khomeini regime argued that if Iran abandon these islands, they would fall under U.S. domination, and Iran's security would be seriously threatened. In spite of the different excuses, Iran's objectives are in reality the same.

Iraq's demand for the return of the three islands to their rightful owners has earned them a distinctive importance. The President of Iraq has asserted many times that this is necessary for peace with Iran.

c. Regional Power:

There is a consensus among students of Iran's foreign policy that, historically, Iran has always played and will continue to play a leading role in the Gulf region. Many political analysts believe that historical and economic imperatives dictate that Iran assume a paramount role in Gulf affairs, "no matter who rules in Iran".(62)

The Iranian-Arab power conflict over the Arab Gulf was in

full bloom as early as the fourth century. Iran's attempts to be the dominant power in the Gulf region added a new dimension to the long conflict between Iraq and Iran. Tensions increased between Baghdad and Tehran when the Shah's ambitious policy began in the Arab Gulf. The events of the 1950s and 1960s in the Middle East signaled the emergence of the U.S. as a major power in the region, especially since the decline of the British traditional role. The U.S. was looking for allies and a foothold to maintain its interests in the Middle East. The Shah of Iran welcomed the alliance with the U.S. for his own interests.

Faced with growing Iranian ambitions, Iraqi leaders in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s felt increasingly isolated politically among the conservative and hereditary regimes in the Gulf. Their sense of isolation was heightened when in late 1972 the United States declared that it would depend on regional allies, especially Iran and Saudi Arabia, to act as political stabilizers -the so-called two pillar policy. The concern of Iraqi leaders became even sharper after Iran became a major buyer of American military hardware and the de facto guardian of the Gulf. American military equipment had begun to flow in significant quantities after 1955; between 1973-74 and 1976-77 more than one-third of all American foreign military sales were made to Iran. Total U.S. arms sales to Iran between 1972 and 1976 amounted to

\$10.6 billion.(63)

As a matter of fact, Iran's military bases became the most powerful arsenal in the Gulf region. The Shah attempted to use his military strength to control the region. In addition to its claim of security, Iran's policy in the Gulf was influenced by far-reaching economic interests.

The U.S. decision to make Iran its military ally in the Middle East was the catalyst that caused Iraq to sign a 15 year friendship treaty with the Soviet Union on April 9, 1972. It also was one of the reasons Iraq began its military build up.

It is now clear that Iran was in competition with Iraq for superiority in the Arab Gulf. Consequently, Iraq and Iran had been involved in a low-level arms race since the Iraqi Nationalist Revolution of July 14, 1958. Each of them had sought to modernize its military forces. Since the British announced that they would withdraw from the region, the military rivalry increased among the two countries for military and political dominance in the Gulf.

In fact, Iran's preponderant military power had a destabilizing impact on the Gulf region because it: 1) exacerbated Iraq's fears of Iran's hegemony in the Gulf,

fears which, in turn, contributed to push Iraq toward consolidating its links with the USSR as a countervailing force against Iran's military superiority; 2) emboldened the Shah to utilize his military capability to further his goals (i.e., seizure of the three Arab islands in the Gulf); and 3) created a dangerous arms race in a volatile region, compounded by superpower involvement.(64)

Moreover, the transfer of arms from the U.S. to the Shah was of great benefit in opposing radical governments and revolutionary organizations in the Gulf area. Bard E. O'Neill analyzed the policy of American arms sales to Iran. He stated that it was:

"enabling Tehran to play a stabilizing role in the region by actively opposing revolutionary groups and regimes such as PFLO [the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman], Iraq, and the PDRY [the People Democratic Republic of Yeman].... It also may be considered a visable alternative to the use of American military forces against radical groups that might threaten United States' interests in the Persian Gulf"(65)

The U.S. arms sales to Iran had far reaching effects. It was meant to stabilize the Gulf region, but in effect it served the Shah's policy and became apparent in many ways. This gave Iran the upper hand in the area. In dealing with its neighbors, Iran supported the Kurdish rebellion in northern Iraq to keep the Iraqi Army fighting within its boundaries and to drain its military capabilities (see

chapter 2). Also, by supporting the Kurdish rebels, Iran attempted to distract Iraq's attention away from Gulf affairs.(66) The U.S. arms transfer helped give the Shah the power to force the Iraqi Government to concede the east side of the Shatt al-Arab River on March 6, 1975, in accordance with the Algeria Agreement. Iraq was forced to settle its disputes with Iran on Iranian terms. In fact, this was the catalyst that planted the seeds of the present day war. Even occupation of the three Arab islands in 1971 was seen by Iran as a move to ensure free navigation in the Strait of Hormuz. Moreover, the Shah feared that there would be an increase in the Arab nationalist movement in the Gulf. Iranian troops were sent to Oman in 1973, to put an end to the leftist guerrillas there. The Iraqi Government protested this intervention. The deployment of Iranian troops, warplanes and helicopters in Oman was part of Iran's expansionist policy.

Arms transfers to Iran led to an arms race in the region. In turn this held a great potential for an armed conflict between Iraq and Iran. The Gulf area is very rich in oil. It also has many disputes such as territorial, tribal, continental shelf, dynastic, ideological, political and economic.(67) The massive arms race aggravated the already existing conflicts in this region. The Shah had the largest build up of arms in the Gulf region, and this vast

inheritance of military equipment was passed on to the Khomeini regime. Between 1972 and 1979, Iran was leading Iraq in the arms race as shown in tables 1 and 2. It is clear from tables 1 and 2 that the arms race between Iraq and Iran continued after the Algeria Agreement of 1975.

Iran's impressive quantitative and qualitative edge in military capabilities led military analysts to view her as the dominant power in the Gulf region. Hence it was assumed that a combination of Iraqi-Saudi military forces was not capable of providing an effective challenge to Iran's military machine without recourse to the external assistance of a superpower. (68)

Nonetheless, the question arises as to whether this disequilibrium of the military balance in Iran's favour was conducive to stability and peace in the Gulf region. Some analysts contend that the military balance plays a "stabilizing role only when there is a relatively equal power distribution among the principal countries of an area or region". (69)

Because of this large military build up, Iran's role of maintaining stability in the Gulf Zone led to an opposite effect. Professor Enver M. Koury stated that:

In a "zone of tension and troubles" the military build-up of one country (i.e., Iran) at the expense of the others could hardly be described as an effort to reinforce a "point of stability". Such a disparity in military power is bound to elevate tension in the area and to increase the arms race among the rivals.(70)

In addition to his false fear from the Iraqi-Soviet treaty of 1972, the Shah initiated armed conflict with Iraq over the borders to receive larger quantities of American advanced military equipment such as F14 and F16 warplanes. Iranian officers talked about "teaching the Iraqis a lesson".(71) As Anthony Sampson said: "The Shah likes to be prickly and then his neighbors decide they want to be prickly too. They don't really want to go to war. But the problem is, when you get a lot of playthings, how long is it before you want to try them out".(72)

The cumulative effects of Iran's massive modernization of its military forces were unsettling for its Arab Gulf neighbours, especially Iraq. It heightened their anxiety and apprehension as to the Shah's ultimate intentions. Iran's military build-up was also viewed with scepticism by several U.S. officials, who had questions about the Shah's ambitions in the region. Even the CIA, in a secret memorandum written by David Blee, a former Deputy Director of the CIA's Covert Operations, and published by the Washington Post, raised doubts about the Shah's objectives.(73)

The Shah's policy of establishing Iranian superiority in the Gulf region developed into a potentially dangerous condition, especially in case of domestic Iranian changes. In this respect, a few months before the Shah's fall, Leslie M. Pryor wrote in the Summer of 1978:

Should the Shah himself be removed from power - a development that cannot be ruled out - a struggle for influence in the region could break out, either in the form of an Arab move against Iran or an Iranian move, led by a hawkish military junta, against a neighbor. (74)

The Iraqi-Iranian war was the realistic application of Pryor's extraordinary prediction.

Since Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in Iran in 1979, the new regime has constantly called on the masses in the Gulf states to overthrow their governments and replace them with Islamic regimes, similar to Khomeini's regime. The Islamic enthusiasm of the Iranian leaders was seen in some ways as a continuance of the Shah's desire to reform the Gulf area in Iran's image. Iranian news media described the Gulf governments as "corrupt" regimes. Ironically, the former Shah of Iran used the same propaganda in 1969. He justified his intervention in Gulf states affairs by describing these states as: "weak governments, weak countries, corrupt ... where the element of subversion will have free ground for

their activities".(75) In this same way, the Iranian President, Ali Khamenei, in early October, 1980, described all the Gulf governments as unbelievers, and continued:

They have betrayed Islam and the Koran. The sheikhs of the Persian Gulf - these greedy pigs which know nothing but satisfying their lust, these sheikhs who have spent their whole life plundering your wealth - We will destroy all the dwarfs if they continue to support falsehood against right. All of you must raise the flag of the Islamic revolution everywhere.(76)

In fact, Iran, whether under the Shah's regime or Khomeini's, has claimed the right to intervene directly against local governments which threaten its idea of balance of power. In a comparison of Khomeini's threat in the Gulf States to that of the Shah's, Professor Koury wrote: "By any standard of measurement, the combined zeal of Islamic ideology and Khomeini's hunger for expansion is far more deadly than that of the Shah's lust for personal power and glory".(77) Through its intervention in the Gulf states affairs, Khomeini's regime has attempted to restore Iran's hegemony over the Gulf area.

Iraq was the main local opponent of Iran's hegemony in the Gulf during the Shah's reign. After his fall, Iraq - with its Pan-Arab ideology - has presented itself as a protector of the Arab Gulf States. For example, when the Iranian's new regime threatened Bahrain, Latif Nusayyif

Jasim, the Iraqi Minister of Culture and Information, declared in September, 1980: "whoever attacks Bahrain will be demolished with bombs. The land of Bahrain is the land of Arabs and it is our duty to defend it".(78) Iran's intervention in the internal affairs of the Arab Gulf States was condemned by the Iraqi Foreign Affairs Minister. He added: "Iraq is determined to defend the Arab nation and the Arabian Gulf region".(79) On the other hand, Khomeini's regime had presented Iran as a protector of the Shi'ite population. He constantly appeals for the Arab Gulf Shi'ites to revolt against their governments. This has been the Iranian regime's attitude toward the Gulf States since the revolution. All of the things previously mentioned caused more tensions and hostilities between both countries.

In summary, Britain's attitude towards the Shah's ambitions in the Gulf region was crucial. Instead of resisting his occupation of the three Arab islands, Britain sought conciliation.

The Iraqi-Iranian rivalry was a quest for a pre-eminent role in Gulf politics. Iran's perceived role as the guardian of Gulf security clashed with Iraq's perception of its role as the guardian and bulwark of Arabism in the Gulf. However, Iraqi-Iranian rivalry to project influence in the Gulf was a function of the prevailing regional balance of power, which

was decisively in Iran's favour. Iran's military superiority was a source of anxiety not only for Iraq, but also for the Arab Gulf states. These states, in particular Iraq, began to be concerned about the Shah's ultimate intentions in the Gulf region, especially in the aftermath of Iran's occupation of the three islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. The Iraqi-Iranian clash in the Gulf centred on Iran's claim to Bahrain, its occupation of the three Arab Islands, and the projection of its military power in Oman.

Iran's policy in the Gulf area continued after the Shah's fall. The new Iranian regime showed hostility toward Iraq and other Arab Gulf states. The Khomeini regime has used the face of religion as a mask to cover Iran's policy in the area. In return, Iraq has proclaimed itself as a protector of the Arab Gulf States.

IRAN'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH ISRAEL:

The Shah's good relationship and policies concerning Israel caused tensions within the Arab World. The Iranian-Israeli ties became one of the strongest arguments used by Iraq and President Nasser of Egypt to disgrace the Shah in the 1960's. They accused him of aligning Iran with Israel, the arch-enemy of the Arabs. Moreover, Israeli aid to the Kurdish rebellion through Iranian territory increased

hostilities between Iraq and Iran.

Despite the denial of the Khomeini regime, Israel supplies weapons to Iran. This has increased tensions in the Middle East. It has become one of the most potent propaganda campaigns used by Iraq against the Ayatollah Khomeini.

a. Iran-Israel: Bilateral Relationships During the Shah's era:

One of the most important fields of Iranian-Israeli co-operation during the Shah's reign is the military field. Military relations between them are very close. In this respect, E.A. Bayne stated that "every general in the Shah's army has visited Israel and hundreds of junior officers have undergone some aspect of Israeli training".(80) Bayne added, "Iran maintains a close military liaison with Israeli Army Staff".(81) Moreover, in an interview with the Shah of Iran, conducted by the Egyptian journalist Mohammad Heikal, he declared that "Iran's cooperation with Israel was not restricted to the intelligence field, but included an exchange of all weapons in the army".(82) It appears that the Shah believed that his aid to Israel would make her stronger and that would force the Arabs to focus their military sights on Israel. In other words, the more the Arabs focus on Israel, the less attention they would give to Iran.

In fact, Iran has benefitted from the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Arab's focus on Israel gave the Shah an opportunity to maintain Iran's hegemony in the Gulf region. On the other hand, Israel gained from the Arab-Iranian disputes. In this respect, Professor Koury stated:

Tehran needs a "common front" with Israel to establish Iran's dominant position in the Gulf area, and to cope with possible Arab subversion in Baluchistan, Kurdistan and Khuzestan (Arabistan). Furthermore, Israel needs the cooperation of Iran to divert some of the Arab enmity toward Iran and away from itself. Some leaders from both sides advocate closer ties with each other as the best deterrent to Arab potential strength.... In essence, then, Iran and Israel share a common interest based on mutual dependency, thus making the potential values of a non-Arab alliance more urgently needed.(83)

The strategic utilization of Israel for the Shah as a bulwark against the expansion of the nationalist Arab movement in the Middle East increased significantly in the 1950s and early 1960s. Two major reasons for this are: 1) the Iraqi nationalist revolution of 1958 and its withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact; and 2) the rapid establishment of the new relations between Baghdad and Moscow, along with Soviet military assistance to the revolutionary regime in Iraq.(84) From the Shah's point of view, this seemed to bring revolutionary Arabs to the Iranian threshold. While the Arab nationalist movement saw Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact as assault against Israel. On the other hand, Iran believed that the balance of power in the Middle East had

shifted against itself and Israel in favour of the Arab radicalism. For Iran, Israel appeared to be the strongest state of anti-revolutionary Arabs. Briefly, "Iran was befriending its enemy's enemy".(85)

Despite the Shah's friendly attitude toward President Sadat during the October War of 1973, he continued to supply Israel with Iranian oil.(86) Indeed, in 1975 the Shah sought to use his oil supplies to Israel as leverage in an attempt to induce Israel to relinquish its control over the Egyptian oilfields in the occupied Sinai Desert. In return for Israel's relinquishing these oilfields, the Shah promised to provide Israel with additional supplies of Iranian oil.(87) Iran's role to promote an Arab-Israeli settlement was recognized by the U.S. Government when Alfred Atherton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, stated in November, 1975 that "without Iran's encouragement, our efforts to promote a peaceful settlement would have been far more difficult".(88)

From the Iraqi point of view, the Shah's encouragement to promote a peaceful settlement between Egypt and Israel, indeed was an imperialist attempt to encircle the revolutionary regimes and destroy the Arab unity. However, Iran's military, commercial and political ties with Israel, Iraq's arch-enemy, embittered the Iraq-Iran relations. The

effectiveness of Iranian-Israeli co-operation was manifested against Iraq through Israeli support to the Kurdish rebellion which is discussed below.

b. Israeli Role in the Kurdish Rebellion:

Israel has shown an increasing interest in supporting the Kurdish rebels. The Israeli secret aid to the Kurdish rebellion stemmed from its co-operation with the Shah of Iran. Israel's goals of supporting the Kurds was to weaken Iraq and discourage any deployment of Iraqi forces on the eastern front against Israel. In regard to Israel, Iraq's refusal of Israel's existence is one of the most important reasons why Israel has supported the Kurdish rebellion.

Despite the fact that Iraq is not a front-line state, it has participated in all the wars against Israel. Iraq has always taken the extreme view that war should be continued with Israel until its destruction. Another reason which led Israel to aid the Kurdish rebellion was to neutralize or reduce Iraq's role in the Arab World and also in any potential Arab-Israeli war. In fact, Israel apparently attempted to open a second front line against the Iraqi Army by supporting the Kurdish rebels. (89)

Despite Israel's denial, its clandestine support for the Kurdish rebellion was disclosed by Obeidullah, the eldest son of the rebellion's leader, Mustafa al-Barzani and Aziz Akrawi, who served as a member of the central political directorate for Barzani as one of his top military commanders. In an interview, Obeidullah and Akrawi were asked why they had defected to the Iraqi Government. They replied that "it was because he [al-Barzani] had become so beholden to the (imperialist) Iran and Israel".(90) Akrawi added that:

there had for many months been in the mountains an Israeli mission of four men equipped with radios operating to Tel Aviv. These men, used code names like Ahmed and Mustafa.... They had tried to use the Kurdish party's links to the interior of Iraq to influence its policies and to gather information of interest to Israel.(91)

The Israeli Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, disclosed officially on September 29, 1980, that "Israel had provided the Kurdish guerrillas with money, arms and instructors from 1965 to 1975".(92) Prime Minister Begin added that Israel had provided the Kurdish rebels with Israeli military advisers to train them.(93) Through Iranian territory, Israel supplies the Kurdish rebels with some Soviet-made military equipment, which was captured by Israel during the 1967 war.(94) Iran increasingly became a passage for arms channelled from Israel to the Kurdish rebels. Moreover, Lee Dinsmore, the former American consul in Kirkuk (north of

Iraq), asserted that Israel sent instructors to Iran, to train the Kurdish rebels.(95) Indeed, Iranian-Israeli common objectives for weakening Iraq, enabled Israel's aid to reach the Kurdish rebels through Iranian territory.

The U.S., Iran and Israel appear to have been motivated by their desire to keep the Iraqi radical regime embroiled in an internal conflict in order to minimize Iraq's military potential. The Kurdish incident showed that the common interests of the U.S., Iran and Israel in weakening the revolutionary government of Iraq led these countries to use the Kurds as a pawn. In fact, the Iranian-Israeli involvement in the Kurdish issue had negative effects on the Iraqi-Iranian relationship and has embittered their conflict.

c. The Israeli Attitude Toward the War:

It is clear that Israel, politically and strategically, is regarded as the main beneficiary from the Iraq-Iran War. The Iraqi-Iranian War has had far-reaching implications for the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Thus, it will continue to be in Israeli's benefit to protract the Gulf War. In regard to this policy, Israeli Deputy Defense Minister, Mordekhay Tzipori, declared on

September 28, 1980, that "Israel could give Iran significant help and permit it, logistically speaking, to continue its war against Iraq".(96) Moreover, a member of the Foreign Affairs and Security Committee in the Knesset suggested on September 29, 1980, that Israel should take the first step in resuming relations with Iran. He added, that Israel "is a natural source for request for aid from Iran as it could supply it with U.S.-made spare parts and other equipment used by the Iranian Army".(97) Obviously, these statements were an indirect message to the Khomeini regime showing Israel's willingness to cooperate with Iran.

It was revealed that Israel had sent weapons and spare parts to Iran. Israel justified its military support for Iran on "the grounds that the sale would retain some pro-Western connection with Iran".(98) Israeli officials insisted that their military arms, which were sent to Iran, were on small scale. In fact, Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Adviser of President Carter disclosed that Israel had secretly supplied Iran with U.S.-made spare parts in October, 1980.(99) However, American officials argued that Israel intended to weaken the Iraqi Army by supporting Iran with military arms and enabling her to continue the war against Iraq.(100)

Despite the Khomeini regime's denial, there were many

reports covering secret Israeli arms sales to Iran. Obvious proof came after the incident with the Argentinean plane on July 18, 1981. It was reported that an Argentinean cargo plane ferrying Israeli arms via Cyprus to Iran crashed in Soviet territory. This incident was the first evidence of the Iranian-Israeli military collaboration. Some Israeli officials, according to the London BBC TV network, believed that the Soviet Union deliberately shot down the plane "to expose the Israeli-Iranian relationship and to prevent Israel from rebuilding its Iranian contacts".(101)

Moreover, in a television interview, the former Iranian President Bani-Sader, revealed that Israel was supplying spare parts and armaments to Iran.(102) Regardless of Khomeini's inflammatory rhetoric against Israel, Iran was supplied with Israeli arms and spare parts. According to the New York Times, Menachem Begin described Iraq as Israel's major enemy in the Middle East. In addition, an American diplomat in the Carter administration believed that the motivation behind Israel's aid to Iran was "an overwhelming Israeli desire not to see Iraq win the war".(103) In fact, Israel's arms sales to Iran are reminiscent of Israeli aid to the Kurdish rebellion, which was also aimed at weakening Iraqi military power. An Israeli official expressed Israel's previous mentioned goal. He said that "ideally we would like to see Iraq disintegrate into a Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni

community, each making war on the other".(104)

Indeed, The strategic cooperation of Israel and Iran did not change when Khomeini came to power because of the geopolitical realities. In this respect, Professor Koury believes that there is a direct link between the Arab-Israeli conflict zone and the Gulf zone. He added:

Nor is it unusual to envision the revival of an Iranian-Israeli axis - albeit tacitly - as was the case during the Shah's reign. For Iran and Israel, the benefits of such a possible arrangement would outweigh the losses. The Israeli arms sale to Khomeini's regime as a result of the Iran-Iraq war could be a prelude to a wider arrangement. Putting aside the reasons behind the Iran-Iraq war and the Israeli invasion of the Lebanon, the net result has been a direct linkage between the "chessboards" of conflicts in the Gulf zone and the Arab-Israeli zone. Under such mitigating circumstances, a temporary arrangement between Iran and Israel should not be dismissed. However deep their mistrust and hatred of each other, Iran and Israel have - though for different reasons - the same basic objectives; namely, to prevent a united Arab policy and/or regional harmony. The fact that Iran and Israel continue to assert their military capabilities over the Arab World raises a number of concerns. It is important to keep in mind this reality when assessing the long-term consequences, and in particular the prospects for stability in the Gulf area.(105)

In summary, The Iraqi-Iranian conflict was seen by Israel as an opportunity to weaken Iraq, whose military power is considered to be the most dangerous threat to Israel's existence. Israel has supported Iran with military arms and spare parts to prevent Iran's collapse. However, Iraq's victory, Israel believes, would militarily pose a real threat

on Israel's eastern front. Politically it would solidify the Arabs in opposing the Camp David Treaty (The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty). The war also encouraged Israel to strike at the Iraqi nuclear facility in June, 1981. Generally speaking, Iraq's ability to directly threaten Israeli security on the military level has been significantly reduced.

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CHAPTER IV

THE ISSUE OF THE WAR

The fall of the Shah's regime in January, 1979, and the accession to power of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran signalled a return to cold war and confrontation in Iraqi-Iranian relations. The depth of the hostility between Iraq and Iran has been very clear since the first days of Khomeini's rule. Within a few months of his rise to power, Khomeini began to call for an Islamic revolution in Iraq. The Ayatollah Khomeini has used religious propaganda against the Iraqi Socialist, Nationalist Government which separates politics and religion. The regional status quo, which was nurtured and maintained by the Shah of Iran and the Iraqi Government since the Algeria Agreement of 1975, was challenged by the Khomeini regime. Khomeini's hostile behaviour toward the Ba'athist regime in Iraq has increased tensions and hostilities between the two countries and finally led to the present day war.

The focus of this chapter is on the following:

The Ideological Clashes

The war of September 22, 1980

THE IDEOLOGICAL CLASHES

The potential for controversy was heightened by the fact that the Ba'ath Party in Iraq based its rule on the premise of Arab Nationalism. Therefore the party rejected the notion that unity should be achieved through the common denominator of Islam irrespective of one's ethnic origins. Rather the Ba'athists believed that Arabism should be the shared ideal whether one was a Muslim or Christian. Therefore, when Iranian statements as early as March, 1979 asked that Arab and State Nationalism be submerged or eliminated, wherever Muslims resided, for the greater unity of the Islamic Revolution, serious concerns began to arise in Iraq about the possibility of sectarian strife.

President Hussein emphasized the potential consequences and his fear of this fundamental disagreement between the two ideologies as early as October, 1979. He described the Arab Revolution as a qualitative transformation that derived its values from history and religion. However, he went on to say that:

"in order for the Islamic revolution or any other revolution to be Islamic, it must be a friend of the Arab revolution. Any contradiction between a revolution which calls itself Islamic and the Arab revolution means that that revolution is not Islamic. As an Arab revolutionary, I understand the matter as such...because a true Islamic revolution should absorb the Arab ideology...and remove any contradiction between it and this

ideology.(1)

Moreover, President Hussein scoffed at those who said there is a difference between Shi'i and Sunni, Arab and Kurd: "we in Iraq are one united people". He added, however, that there might be a new attempt to divide the Arab homeland.(2)

In fact, there was an unbridgeable gap between Khomeini and all Arab nationalists. Khomeini believed that the ultimate aim of Islam was "to abolish nationality", and therefore Arab Nationalism was "fundamentally opposed to Islam" because it hindered the ability of Islam to act as a uniting force, religiously and politically.(3) To the hardline Islamic revolutionaries in Iran, Arab Nationalism not only in Iraq but in any other country was a negative and obstructionist philosophy that would have to be eliminated before the Islamic Revolution could proceed.(4) As a matter of fact, Khomeini does not believe in Arab Nationalism and as long as he opposes Arab Nationalism it means he wants to fragment the Islamic community. Without any doubt this threatens the Arab Nation.

The Ayatollah Khomeini's attitude towards the Iraqi leadership and the inherent conflict between Arab Nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism now deserves attention. In France during 1978, between his expulsion from Iraq and his return

to Iran, Khomeini was asked to list his enemies. He replied, "First, the Shah, then the American Satan, then Saddam Hussein and his infidel Ba'ath Party".(5) As the source of this quotation noted, Khomeini by 1980 had defeated the Shah, had humiliated the Americans by seizing their embassy, and had turned his attention to the third remaining enemy -President Hussein and the Ba'athists. Aside from ideology, Khomeini might have had personal reasons to harbor a grudge against Iraq. After the Algeria Agreement of 1975, Iraq had attempted to improve relations with the Shah, which required clamping down on Khomeini's activities in Najaf (Iraq) and eventually placing him under house arrest before actually expelling him. Sometime during the Fall of 1977, one of Khomeini's two sons died in an unexplained and sudden manner in Najaf. Although Khomeini accused the Shah, one must wonder whether Khomeini also felt bitterness against Iraq either for the lapse of security -if indeed he believed his son was assassinated- or for what he saw as cooperation after 1975 between the Shah and Iraq.

The stage setting for the war therefore was complete long before the hostilities began. After Khomeini returned to Iran, his Islamic revolution became an issue of growing concern to Iraqi leadership and to Arab moderates throughout the Middle East. The conflict between the two ideologies was a war for minds, fought at least initially with the symbols

of identification -whether ethnic, religious, or nationalistic- that were readily available to all participants.

THE WAR OF SEPTEMBER 22, 1980

Hostile propaganda which coincided with border clashes and terrorist attacks against Iraqi officials further eroded the peace between the two countries. The escalation of terrorist attacks backed by Iran against eminent Iraqi officials in April, 1980 was the manifestation of the Iranian shift in tactics. This change signalled Iran's objective of destabilizing the Ba'ath Government in Iraq. Moreover, the political chaos and discord among the political powers in Iran gave arise to conflicting voices in its foreign policy toward Iraq and other Gulf states. It also worsened Iran's relations with its neighbors, particularly Iraq. In fact, Khomeini's extreme campaign against Iraq, as political observers viewed, was "a convenient vehicle to deflect attention away from the deteriorating domestic situation and the fragmentation of power in Iran".(6)

On September 10, 1980, the Iraqi foreign minister, Dr. Sa'adoun Hammadi, declared that Iranian troops had not withdrawn from certain territories, including the Zain

al-Qaws [122sq. km], Maimak [110sq. km] and Saif Sa'ad [105sq. km] regions on the Iraq-Iran border as stipulated by the Algeria Agreement of 1975.(7) Notes of protest had been sent to Iran's representative in Baghdad, stating that in the absence of a response Iraq would be forced to expel the offending troops. Hammadi advised the Iranian Government to consult the agreements between the two countries, to return other areas affected by the treaty, and to refrain from escalating the crisis. On September 14, however, the acting chief of staff of the Iranian army, General Fallahi, stated in an interview that Iran would not honor the agreement, implying that it had been foisted upon his country by foreign powers.(8)

Three days later the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council formally abrogated the Algeria Agreement, citing Iran's failure to return Iraqi territory and its interference in Iraqi domestic affairs, especially in the Kurdish area (see Appendix IX). It will be recalled that violation of one part of the treaty would abrogate it in its entirety.(9) Cross-border hostilities initiated by both sides had continued with mounting intensity throughout August and September 1980. Iraq accused Iran of using heavy artillery to shell its border towns of Khanaqin, Mandali and Zurbatiyah, as well as the oil installation at Naft Khanah (see map no.8).(10) Each side accused the other of beginning

hostilities.

It is worth noting that in view of: 1) Iran's lack of response to the Algeria Agreement as a comprehensive package deal; 2) Iran's insistence, as expressed by responsible Iranian officials that the Algeria Agreement was inconsistent with Iranian national interests; and 3) Iranian assertion, as expressed by Iranian officials, that Iran did not consider itself bound by the provisions of this agreement, it became evident to the Iraqi Government that the Khomeini regime had actually violated the elements of comprehensive settlement embodied in the Treaty of 1975. Consequently, the Iraqi Government believed that Iran considered the agreement to be unilaterally terminated on its part. Therefore, Iraq officially took the decision to abrogate the treaty.

In fact, Iraq's decision abrogating the March 6, 1975 agreement with Iran was an ominous sign of the complete deterioration of relations between both sides. As a matter of fact, it was the last step that led both countries into the war. Intense and widespread clashes along the borders began between the two countries. It was reported on September 18, 1980, and the following days that there was heavy fighting along the Shatt al-Arab River.(11)

On September 22, 1980, Iraq launched air raids on ten

Iranian airfields in many Iranian cities. Also, it announced that Iraqi forces had entered into Iranian territory. Thus the situation between the two countries had reached a full-scale war. Indeed, the fierce condition of the war appeared from the first day. Each country had bombed the other's vital oil installations and key economic facilities. Moreover, Iran announced that it would not allow any merchant ship to carry cargo to Iraqi ports.(12)

In fact, Iraq's precise goals in launching its September 22, 1980, attack on Iran were complicated and multiple. The Iraqis described their action as a pre-emptive and defensive battle. From this point of view, Iraq designed the move to put an end to Iran's interference in Iraqi and the Arab Gulf states' domestic affairs by preventing Khomeini's attempts to export his Islamic Revolution to these countries. Iraqi authorities also declared that Iraq's goals were to stop Iranian attempts to revive the Kurdish insurgency.(13)

In strategic terms, as I mentioned before, the Shatt al-Arab River is Iraq's only access to the Gulf. Therefore, Iraq's limited geopolitical location required it to take action, particularly in response to Iran's threat to Iraq's security interests in the Arab Gulf.

It is clear that the goals of Iraq's incursion into Iran

were a combination of the following purposes:

First, to destroy Iranian military power while the balance of power had shifted in Iraq's favour. This shift precipitated by the decimation of the Iranian revolutionary upheaval. To take advantage of this situation the Iraqi regime decided to launch a full-scale war. Second, Iraq's goal was probably to expose Iran's military weakness and to project Iraq as the leading power in the Gulf. By restoring its military power in the Gulf, the Ba'ath probably believed that this would force the regional powers such as Syria and conservative Gulf states to recognize Iraq's power and influence. This point of view appeared in a declaration made by Tareq Aziz when he declared that one of Iraq's objectives was "to prove in battle that Iraq is stronger than Iran and fully capable of defeating it. And this is what Iraq has actually achieved".(14) Similarly, Adnan Khairallah, the Iraqi Defence Minister, pointed out that the Iraqi Army had destroyed the "myth of Iran's hegemony" in the Gulf region.(15)

The third objective of Iraq's incursion into Iran was to protect the Iraqi borders from a long series of Iranian military violations and to restore to Iraq its territories near Qasr-e-Shireen and Mehran. Restoring these territories to Iraq's sovereignty would secure the main roads to Baghdad from any Iranian approach to the capital. This was clearly

reflected in a declaration by Tareq Aziz, when he stated that among Iraq's goals was the destruction of the Iranian military power, which had been threatening "our homeland" for a long time.(16) Similarly, President Saddam Hussein maintained that one of Iraq's objectives was to "prevent Iran shelling Iraqi border towns, which were within range of Iranian artillery"(17)

The fourth goal of Iraq's attack on Iran was to get rid of the Algeria Agreement of 1975, which Iraq believed had been signed under duress. This was reflected in the Iraqi President's speech of September 17, 1980, when he stated that Iraq had been under pressure to sign the agreement because of Iran's massive military support to the Kurdish insurgency, which had threatend Iraq's territorial integrity.(18)

The fifth objective was to overthrow the Khomeini regime. The Ba'ath Government may have hoped to defeat the Iranian regime by creating such frustration among the Iranian military ranks that they were urged to overthrow the clergymen regime. This was also reflected in Iraq's cooperation with Iranian anti-Khomeini regime groups which have attempted to overthrow the Iranian regime.(19)

The Iraqi leadership might have been encouraged by the following elements to launch such a limited war:

A. The disorganization of the Iranian Army.(20)

B. International isolation which surrounded Iran during the U.S. hostage crisis.

C. The increased tensions and fights between the Khomeini government and the Iranian ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Arabs and Baluchis.(21)

D. The strong relations between Iraq and the wealthy Arab Gulf states which shared its security fears about Iran.(22)

On the other hand, Iran described Iraq's invasion as an attempt to destroy the Iranian Islamic revolution. This was reflected in a speech made by Mohammad Ali Rajai, the former Iranian Prime Minister, before the United Nations.(23)

In fact, Iraq has made critical mistakes in "grand strategy in starting a war that it did not know how to finish and that left Iraq as vulnerable as its enemy".(24) Moreover, Iraq's attack on Iran on September 22, 1980, created a situation that diverted the so called Iranian Civil War against an outside threat.

The main result of the war was that Iraq and Iran were exhausted financially and militarily, and drained of their human and economic resources. This enhanced Saudi Arabia's political role and gave it tremendous leverage over the other Gulf states.

The war, while weakening Iraq militarily and financially, also circumscribed its political and diplomatic options. Consequently, Iraq's emergent leadership in the Arab world was substantially weakened and it became increasingly dependent on the diplomatic and financial support of the Gulf states. This had a profound effect on Iraq's policy orientation, a fact which encouraged it increasingly to join the Arab moderate camp.

By the same token, Iraq's military debilitation weakened the eastern front against Israel and had adverse effects on the Arab-Israeli balance of power. This military imbalance redounded to Israel's advantage and was one of the factors which led Israel to embark on a full-scale invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982.

The war led to a growing naval build-up on the part of the superpowers in the Gulf region. Fear of spill-over effects of the war, coupled with Iran's repeated threats to close the strategic Strait of Hormuz, further intensified the Western naval build-up, particularly the U.S. presence in the region.

While leading to an increased naval build-up by the superpowers in the Gulf region, the Iraq-Iran war nonetheless

demonstrated the marginal leverage of both superpowers in influencing the behaviour of the two warring countries.

In the early Summer of 1982, Iraq withdrew its forces from all Iranian territory and declared its readiness for peace negotiations. However, the Iraqi withdrawal did not satisfy the Khomeini regime whose aim was to overthrow the Ba'ath Government in Iraq.

The Iranians have launched many attacks to cross the Iraqi borders since June, 1982. Thousands of people were killed or taken as prisoners of war from both sides during these attempts. Despite the fact of heavy losses in forces on both sides, heavy fighting has continued through the time of this writing. Many efforts made by the UN, the Non-Alignment Movement, and the Islamic Conference Organization have failed to put an end to this bloody war. Although Iraq has declared its readiness for a cease fire and peace negotiations, the Khomeini regime has vowed that Iran would not cease fire until the overthrow of the Iraqi President and the Ba'ath Government.

In summary, the fall of the Shah and the coming to power of the Ayatollah Khomeini had unsettling effects on Iraqi-Iranian relations. It brought into conflict a radical, Pan-Islamic religious regime in Iran and a secular,

nationalist regime in Iraq. Iran's commitment to the export of its revolution abroad sharpened and complicated the ideological clashes between the two countries, which led to a progressive deterioration in relations. Each began lending moral and material support to the opponents of the other, as well as instigating disturbances among various ethnic and religious groups, in an attempt at destabilization.

The war had far-reaching effects on the Gulf region. As a result, Iraq's relations with Saudi Arabia and the other conservative Gulf states were consolidated. The growing tension in Arab-Iranian relations further accentuated the clash between Arab and Persian nationalism in the Gulf, and subsequently led Iraq to perceive its role as that of a bulwark against Iran's onslaught of revolutionary radicalism in the region. Also underlying the Iraqi-Iranian conflict was the attempt on the part of both powers to assume a leading role in the strategic Gulf region.

The war between Iraq and Iran has had catastrophic effects for both sides in economic, military and human terms. Furthermore, it has had wide-ranging ramifications, regional and global. The prolongation of this war and its potential expansion to neighbouring countries have greatly increased tension in the Gulf area. This has also threatened stability in a highly strategic region.

NOTES

1. FBIS (MEA), October 17, 1979, p.E4.
2. FBIS (MEA), February 11, 1980, pp.E1-E4.
3. Hamid Algar, ed., Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini, (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p.332.
4. Al-Majallah, March 6-12, 1982, pp.1,3,6.
5. Time, July 26, 1982, p.25.
6. New York Times, April 9, 1980, Quoted in Jasem M. Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years of Crisis, (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1984), p.190.
7. Abdulghani, p.201.
8. Ministry of Education and Information, "Selection From The Iraqi-Iranian Dispute", p.27. See also Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "The Iraqi-Iranian Dispute in terms of International Law", (Baghdad, 1981), p.15. Iraq cited other statements attributed to the Iranian officials, such as a statement made by the Iranian Foreign Minister, he informed Iraq's ambassador in Tehran that the Iranian government is not pleased with the 1975 accord, adding: "who told you we are satisfied with that accord? There is still an open account between us, and there is a lot we shall claim from you". See Al-Hawadith, (Beirut), June 22, 1979. Also, Itila'at newspaper of Tehran reported a statement given by Dr. Sadeq Tabtabai, the official spokesman of the Iranian

government in which he said "according to Algeria Accord, Iraq and Iran agreed that Iraq would not provide any aid to the opposing elements to Iran which benefited from the Iraqi mass media. On the other hand the Shah promised to stop all aid granted to Barzani and their head Mulla and not to provide them any opportunity to benefit from Iran in their acts against Iraq. The Iranian government stopped Kurdish moves against Iraq." The Iranian official spokesman went on saying, "that question has now changed as the Iranian Central Government does not abide by this agreement". See Ministry of Education and Information, "Selection From The Iraqi-Iranian Dispute", p.27. Also on September 17, 1980, the Iranian former President Bahr Sadr officially declared that "Iran had not implemented the Algeria Agreement, particularly with regard to restoring to Iraq the Iranian-controlled border areas". See J.M. Abdulghani, "Iraq and Iran", p.203. For more details see FBIS (SA), September 18, 1980, p.13.

9. Abdulghani, p.202.

10. Ministry of Education and Information, "Selection From the Iraqi-Iranian Dispute", (Baghdad, 1981), pp.73-76.

11. New York Times, September 19, 20, 21, 1980.

12. New York Times, September 23, 1980.

13. Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Iraqi-Iranian Conflict", p.219, Quoted in Abdulghani, "Iraq and Iran", p.204.

14. Tareq Aziz, Iraq-Iran Conflict: Questions and Discussion, (London: Third World Center for Research and Publishing, 1981), p.28.

15. New York Times, January 4, 1981.

16. An interview with Tareq Aziz, the Deputy Premier of Iraq and a member of the Revolution Command Council, cited in Al-Watan al-Arabi, June 4-10, 1982, pp.20-22.

17. Al-Thawrah, (Baghdad), December 26, 1980, Quoted in Abdulghani, p.205.

18. Saddam Hussein, Iraq Asserts its Sovereignty, Text of President Saddam Hussein's speech of September 17, 1980, on the invalidity of the 1975 agreement. Translated by Naji Al-Hadithi, (Baghdad: Published by Translation and Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981), pp.5-16.

19. This was appeared in the Former Iranian Premier, Shahpour Bakhtiar's statement when he stated that he is ready "to collaborate with the Iraqi government", to overthrow the Khomeini regime. See New York Times, October 22, 1980.

20. Apparently, the Iraqi leadership believed that Iranian forces would be in no condition to fight due to extensive purges in the Iranian high command and officer corps, disruption of Training, and disorganization of maintenance and logistic facilities. In addition, a military coup attempt had been made on the Khomeini regime in August, 1980. See Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press,

1984), p.649; See also Abdul Rahman Siddiqi, "The Gulf War of Attrition", Defence Journal, 6, no.41, (Winter 1980-81), pp.134-153.

21. Most of Iran's minorities were becoming increasingly hostile to the Iranian clergymen regime.

22. The Iraqi leadership had built up a coalition of Arab support for any move against Iran. In this connection, Iraq apparently secured the particularly important financial support of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states during a meeting between President Saddam Hussein and King Khalid at the city of Ta'if in early August 1980. See Jao Stork, "Iraq: The War in the Gulf", MERIP REPORTS, no.97, (June 1981), p.12. See also Claudia Wright, "Implications of the Iraq-Iran War", Foreign Affairs, no.59, (1980/81), pp.275-303; and Arab Press Service, October 18, 1980.

23. UN Security Council, Provisional Verbatim Record 2251 meeting S/PV, October 17, 1980, p.11.

24. Cordesman, p.648.

CONCLUSION

The historical and cultural differences between Iraq and Iran have influenced both countries' perceptions of each other. Furthermore, the Iraq-Iran relationship has been shaped by these differences. The strategic and economic factors as well as the existence of the holy Shi'ite shrines in Iraq are the basis of Persia's ambitions to dominate Iraq. These Shrines and the Iraqi Shi'ites have been used by Persia as a vehicle to achieve its ambitions. To dominate Iraq, Persia presented itself as the protector of the Shi'ites of Iraq. However, Iran's policy for domination over Iraq has been a constant characteristic, since the establishment of the Safawid Dynasty of Persia in the sixteenth century.

The Ottoman Empire, which cast itself in the role of the Sunni's defender, strongly impeded Persia's quest to dominate Iraq. Rivalry between the Ottomans and Persians for control over Iraq made it a battleground for the two powers. Ottoman-Persian rivalry had significant effects for Iraq's social and political stability. The development of strong social and political institutions in Iraq was obstructed by this rivalry. Consequently, the growth of divisive tendencies was encouraged by both powers. These tendencies manifested themselves in the Arab-Kurdish polarization and the Shi'ite-Sunni division.

Regardless of the nature of the rulers in Iraq or Iran, their frontier disputes, especially over the Shatt al-Arab River, were a constant cause of conflict between the two countries. Even when Iraq was ruled by the royal regime, which was similar to the monarchical, conservative regime in Iran, this similarity in their political regimes did not prevent the eruption of complex crises over the disputed frontier.

Iraqi-Iranian relations were deeply impaired by the fall of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958, and Iraq's defection from the Baghdad Pact. The Iraqi Revolution of July 14th, 1958, had adverse effects on the Iraq-Iran relationship. The emergence of the revolutionary regime in Iraq served as a catalyst which increased Iran's fears of Iraq's move toward the Arab Nationalist revolutionary camp.

The rise to power of the Ba'ath Party in 1968 had a deep impact on the relations between Iraq and Iran. The Ba'ath Party injected an ideological element into Iraq's foreign policy orientation which sharpened the polarity between Persian nationalism and Arab nationalism in the Gulf region. The traditional, cultural and historical suspicions between Arabs and Iranians were intensified by the clash between the two nationalisms.

The fall of the Shah and the rise of the Ayatollah Khomeini to power in Iran marked the end of the status quo in the Gulf region which had been created and maintained by the Shah and the Iraqi Government since the Algeria Agreement of 1975. Because of Khomeini's ideological principles, he attempted to destroy this status quo and replace it with a new political order. Consequently, the coming of the Ayatollah Khomeini to power signalled a sharp return of the tensions and confrontations in the Iraq-Iran relationship. The emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran inserted a new ideological dimension to the area, putting a universalist religious regime in Iran against a nationalist, socialist and secular regime in Iraq. Intensifying the ideological clash between both regimes was Khomeini's belief that the Iranian Revolution was a forerunner of the world revolution. As a result of his belief, efforts have been made to export the Khomeini Revolution beyond Iran, especially to Iraq and other Arab Gulf countries.

Following the Iranian Revolution, the role of both Iraq and Iran in the Gulf region was reversed. Iraq had been described by Iran and the conservative Arab Gulf states as a revolutionary, anti-status quo power in the Gulf in 1970s. However, the Iranian revolution served as the catalyst that accelerated the solidarity and collaboration between Iraq and

the conservative Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Since the Shah's fall, the conservative states saw Iraq as a defender of the status quo in the region against the Iranian radical regime.

Hostility between Iraq and Iran reached its highest point when the war brokeout in September, 1980. Misperceptions and miscalculations were made by both countries. Each country misunderstood the internal dynamics of the other, and both over estimated each other's vulnerabilities. In return, these misperceptions influenced each side's calculations. For example, Iran's expectations of the Shi'ite uprising in Iraq did not take place when the war started. On the other hand, Iraq's expectation of a mass nationalist uprising by the Arabs in Khuzistan (Arabistan) did not materialize when Iraq invaded Iran in 1980.

Having expected a quick victory, Iraq was unprepared for the Iranian ability to regroup and for the war of attrition that followed. This was another grave miscalculation, for there were no internal constraints on the time horizon of the Iranian government. It two potentially disaffected groups - a growing number of unemployed and the military, which had sustained several purges since Khomeini's return to Iran - could be kept preoccupied by the war, it was to the advantage of the new Iranian leaders to prolong the fighting.

Moreover, the Iranians had a stiff resolve to resist the invasion at almost any human cost. Many factors contributed to this phenomenon, among which were that Persians and Arabs were historically antipathetic to each other; that the Iranians were fighting on their own soil; and that the Revolutionary Guards and the regular military eventually were able to coordinate their efforts.

Iraq's sense of geopolitical vulnerability was intensified by the war. When the Shatt al-Arab waterway was closed, this virtually rendered Iraq as a landlocked state and put it under the mercy of neighbouring countries for access to the sea. Therefore, Iraq will continue to insist on unlimited access to the Shatt al-Arab as a vital navigable waterway to the sea. This sensitive vulnerability has strategic and security implications for Iraq. Moreover, it will unquestionably influence Iraq's behaviour in the Gulf region.

This war is complicated and costly and has caused intensive devastation for both countries. Neither Iraq nor Iran is capable of a clear military victory. The war has vividly demonstrated the reality that a military solution is not a practical choice for settling the Iraqi-Iranian dispute. Any solution will have to be political.

Many attempts have been made to prevent further escalation of the conflict. Many countries, regional and international organizations have attempted to mediate in this conflict and to put an end to the war. However, all these mediation attempts have come to no avail through the present time. The Ayatollah Khomeini insisted that Iran's conditions for negotiating an end to the war is the overthrow of President Saddam Hussein and the Ba'thists. In effect, the following complicated factors have turned the conflict to a bitter level, such as:

- 1) Iran's refusal of all peaceful offers to negotiate an end to the war;
- 2) Its view of the conflict as a struggle between the forces of good and evil;
- 3) Its rigid doctrinaire posture; and
- 4) Its perception of the war as a zero-sum game in which Iran seeks to impose total defeat on Iraq.

Consequently, all these complicated factors are not conducive to any political accommodation or compromise. Due to Khomeini's adamant insistence on toppling President Hussein and the Ba'ath regime, an escalation might widen the zone of the conflict, particularly when Iraq repeated its threats to strike at Iranian oil installations in the Kharg Island if Iran does not show any readiness to end the war. In return, Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz and

attack the oil installations in the small Arab Gulf states if the Iraqis do so. This portend further escalated the war to a dangerous level which might drag other Gulf states into the Iraqi-Iranian conflict and invite superpower intervention into a highly sensitive region.

For both Iraq and Iran it is difficult either to capitulate or to compromise because of the ideological premises of the ruling elites and because of the social and political implications of the war. The idealism, rhetoric, and philosophy of both regimes have not only inhibited negotiations but also polarized a dispute that might otherwise have been more amenable to settlement. Neither President Hussein and the Ba'ath Party nor Khomeini and the Islamic republicans could readily negotiate their own demise or easily abandon the principles for which they fought because of the ever-growing need to justify the sacrifices made in the war.

Another cause of frustration was that Iraqi leadership believed all key decisions in Iranian domestic and foreign affairs were made or heavily influenced by Khomeini himself. Iraq did not expect him to compromise his extreme Islamic conservative stance, or his distrust of Arab nationalism in general and of Iraqi Ba'athists in particular.

Moreover, the different geopolitical perception of both countries, and their rivalry to assume a superior role in the Gulf region, will continue to be a source of tensions and hostilities between them for many years in the future. Therefore, the war of September, 1980 is another phase in the continuing historical enmity between the two neighbouring countries.

However, because of their geographical contiguity, as well as their location in a strategic oil region, and to prevent superpower intervention, the two countries must reach some arrangements of settlement in order to handle and resolve their conflict peacefully. In addition, the grim consequences of the war and the long-term interests of both countries must push them to discard their differences in settling their conflict.

In order to reduce tensions and hostilities and to achieve a lasting settlement, two major issues must be resolved. First, both countries must reach a lasting solution to their historical boundary dispute. Second, both countries should cease their intervention into each other's domestic affairs. Practical and lasting peace can be reached by resolving these two major issues which have harassed the Iraqi-Iranian relations for many decades. To accomplish this, Iran should be realistic and flexible. Moreover, it

should abandon its unrealistic effort to overthrow President Hussein and the Ba'ath Government. The Iranian regime should also abandon its hostile attitude towards the Arabs in the Gulf region and prove that it is really different from the Shah's regime.

If Iraq and Iran do not reach a final and durable solution to their differences in order to make peace, their conflict will be a continual aspect of their relations and the basic source of tensions, hostilities and instability in the Gulf area for a long time to come.

APPENDIX I

TREATY OF ERZERUM OF MAY 31st, 1847

ARTICLE 1

THE TWO MUSSULMAN POWERS waive the totality of their existing pecuniary claims on one another, provided always that nothing in this arrangement shall affect the provisions made for the settlement of the claims to which Article 4 relates.

ARTICLE 2

The Persian Government undertakes to cede to the Ottoman Government all the lowlands—that is to say, the land in the western part of the province of Zohab; and the Ottoman Government undertakes to cede to the Persian Government the eastern—that is to say, all the mountains—part of the said province, including the Kirind Valley.

The Persian Government abandons all claim to the city and province of Suleimani, and formally undertakes not to interfere with or infringe the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Government over the said province.

The Ottoman Government formally recognizes the unrestricted sovereignty of the Persian Government over the

city and port of Muhammara, the Island of Khizr, the anchorage, and the land on the eastern bank—that is to say, the left bank—of the Shatt al-Arab, which are in the possession of the tribes, recognized as belonging to Persia. Further, Persian vessels shall have the right to navigate freely without let or hindrance on the Shatt al-Arab from the mouth of the same to the point of contact of the frontiers of the two Parties.

ARTICLE 3

The two Contracting Parties, having by the present Treaty waived their other territorial claims, undertake forthwith to appoint commissioners and engineers as their respective representatives for the purpose of determining the frontiers between the two States in conformity with the preceding article.

ARTICLE 4

Both Parties are agreed as to the appointment forthwith, by both Parties, of commissioners for the purpose of adjudicating and making a fair settlement in all cases of damage suffered by either Party since the acceptance of the friendly proposals drawn up and communicated by the two Mediating Great Powers in the month of Jemaziyyu-l-evvel,

1261, together with all questions of pasturage dues since the year in which the arrears in the payment of the latter began.

ARTICLE 5

The Ottoman Government undertakes that the fugitive Persian Princes shall reside at Brussa, and shall not be permitted to leave that place or maintain secret relations with Persia. The two High Contracting Powers further undertake that all the other refugees shall be handed over in conformity with the earlier Treaty of Erzerum.

ARTICLE 6

Persian merchants shall pay the customs dues on their goods, in kind or in cash, according to the current present value of such goods, in the manner specified in the article relating to trade in the Treaty of Erzerum concluded in 1238*. No additional charge whatsoever shall be levied over and above the amounts fixed in the said Treaty.

*A.H. 1238 = A.D. 1823.

ARTICLE 7

The Ottoman Government undertakes to accord the requisite privileges to enable Persian pilgrims, in accordance with the former treaties, to visit the Holy Places in the Ottoman dominions in complete safety and without vexatious treatment of any kind. Further, the Ottoman Government, being desirous of strengthening and consolidating the bonds of friendship and concord which should subsist between the two Mussulman Powers and between their respective subjects, undertakes to adopt such measures as may be most appropriate to ensure the participation, not only of Persian pilgrims, but of all other Persian subjects, in all the said privileges in the Ottoman dominions, in such manner as to protect them from any sort of injustice, molestation, or incivility, whether in respect of their commercial activities or in any other respect.

Furthermore, the Ottoman Government undertakes to recognize Consuls to be appointed by the Persian Government in places in the Ottoman dominions where their presence may be required on account of commercial interests, or for the protection of persian merchants and other Persian subjects, save only in Mecca the Revered and Medina the Resplendent, and to respect in the case of the said Consuls all the privileges due in virtue of their official character and accorded to consuls of other friendly Powers.

The Persian Government, for its part, undertakes to accord reciprocity of treatment in every respect to Consuls to be appointed by the Ottoman Government in place in Persia in which the latter may consider the appointment of Consuls to be necessary, as also to Ottoman merchants and other Ottoman subjects visiting Persia.

ARTICLE 8

The two High Contracting Mussulman Powers undertake to adopt and enforce the measures necessary to prevent and punish theft and brigandage on the part of the tribes and peoples settled on the frontier, to which end they will quarter troops in suitable localities. They further undertake to do their duty in respect of all forms of aggressive acts, such as pillage, robbery, or murder, which may occur in their respective territories.

Contested tribes over which the suzerainty is not known shall be left free by the two High Contracting Powers to choose once and for all and specify the localities which they will henceforward always inhabit. Tribes over which the suzerainty is known shall be compelled to come within the territory of the State to which they belong.

ARTICLE 9

All points or articles of previous treaties, and especially of the Treaty concluded at Erzerum in 1238, which are not specifically amended or annulled by the present Treaty, are hereby reaffirmed in respect of any and all of their provisions, as if they were reproduced in their entirety in the present Treaty.

The two High Contracting Powers agree that, when the texts of this Treaty have been exchanged, they will accept and sign the same, and that the ratifications thereof shall be exchanged within the space of two months, or earlier.

APPENDIX II

EXPLANATORY NOTE RELATIVE TO CERTAIN STIPULATIONS IN
THE PROPOSED TREATY OF ERZERUM, ADDRESSED BY THE
BRITISH AND RUSSIAN AMBASSADORS AT CONSTANTINOPLE TO
THE OTTOMAN GOVERNMENT ON APRIL 26th, 1847

The undersigned, representing the Mediating Courts of Great Britain and Russia, have had the honor to receive the identic note, with annex, which His Excellency Ali Effendi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, was pleased to address to them on the 11th instant, relating to the Turco-Persian negotiations.

The undersigned are highly gratified to note from the communication in question His Excellency's statement, on behalf of the Sublime Porte, of the decision to issue instructions forthwith to the Ottoman Plenipotentiary at Erzerum to sign the articles of the Treaty with the Court of Persia unamended, according to the text drawn up by the Commissioners of the two Mediating Courts, as submitted for the acceptance of the Governments concerned by their plenipotentiaries at Erzerum, subject to explanations by the representatives of the said Courts at Constantinople to the Sublime Porte on certain points which the latter does not consider sufficiently clear.

The points on which the Sublime Porte requires

explanations are as follows:

1. The Sublime Porte presumes that the clause of Article 2 of the draft Treaty ceding the city, port, and anchorage of Muhammara, and the island of Khizr, to Persia, cannot include either the territory of the Sublime Porte comprised* outside the city or the other ports of the Sublime Porte situate in these parts.

The Sublime Porte is also concerned to know whether, under the terms of another part of the same article relating to tribes which, while actually belonging to Persia, may happen to be divided, one half being settled in Ottoman territory and the other half in Persian territory, it follows that those parts of the tribes which are in Turkey will also become subject to Persia, and the territory in their possession will accordingly also be ceded to Persia; and whether Persia will ever be entitled at some future date to dispute with the Porte the right to the possession of such territory.

2. The Sublime Porte is concerned to know whether, under the existing terms of Article 1 and 4, the Persian Government

*The word "situate" (situees) is used instead of "comprised" (comprises) in the extract communicated to the Persian Envoy in January, 1848.

is entitled to include the pecuniary compensations as between the two governments which it had entirely renounced, in the category of individual claims. The Porte understands these claims to apply solely to certain pasturage dues and to losses incurred by the respective subjects of the two Governments as a result of the activities of brigands and the like.

The Sublime Porte further asks whether the Persian Government's assent will be obtained on the question of fortifications added to Article 2, as also in respect of the passages regarding reciprocity which were omitted in Article 7 of the Commissioner's draft.

The undersigned Representatives, being anxious and bound to dispel the uncertainties of the Sublime Porte on all the above questions, hereby declare as follows:

Ad 1. The anchorage of Muhammara is the part situated opposite the city of muhammara in the Haffar Canal, and this definition is not susceptible of any other interpretation.

The undersigned Representatives are further in agreement with the Ottoman Minister in the view, that, inceding to Persia in the region in question the city, port and anchorage of Muhammara and the island of Khizr, the Sublime Porte is not ceding any other territory or any other ports there may be in this region.

The undersigned Representatives further declare that Persia will not be entitled on any pretext whatsoever to put forward claims in regard to the region situate on the right bank of the Shatt-al-Arab, or to the territory on the left bank belonging to Turkey, even where Persian tribes or parts of such tribes are established on the said bank or in the said territory.

Ad 2. As regards the sublime porte's apprehension that Articles 1 and 4 of the draft Treaty may be irregularly interpreted in such a way as to give rise to the revival by the Persian Government of the Pecuniary claims as between the two Governments, the undersigned Representatives hereby declare that, inasmuch as it is explicitly stipulated in Articles 1 and 4 of the draft Treaty that all claims of this kind from whatever source are, and are to continue to be, waived, there can be no resumption of the discussions on the matter in any case, and that only the claims of individuals will be entitled to satisfaction by the two Parties respectively; and, further, that the examination and validity of such individual claims will be subject, as agreed, to a special commission to be appointed ad hoc and that the decision as to what claims are to be regarded as individual claims will also have to be referred to this commission.

In reply to the two subsidiary questions raised at the conclusion of His Excellency Ali Effendi's note, the undersigned Representatives believe that they are justified in stating that the Persian Government will readily agree to the insertion in Article 7 of the clause with regard to reciprocity of treatment to be observed by both Governments in mutual interest of their respective subjects, pilgrims and consular agents. As regards the question of fortifications, they can only express their personal opinion that a reciprocal undertaking on the part of the two Mussulman Governments not to fortify the banks of the Shatt-al-Arab would constitute one more guarantee of the maintenance of peaceful relations between the two countries, well calculated powerfully to cement the bonds of goodwill which it is the object of the Treaty in question to establish.

The undersigned Representatives are accordingly entirely prepared to support the fulfilment of the wishes of the Sublime Porte on this point through the intermediary of their colleagues in Tehran; and they have reason to hope that their representations in this connection will not be without effect.

At the same time, the undersigned Representatives are of [the] opinion that the signature of the Treaty might without inconvenience take place without waiting for the issue of the negotiations on the special point in question, as to which there would be no difficulty in appending subsequently an additional clause to the Treaty.

Pera, April 26th, 1847

The undersigned, etc.

Oustinof

H. Wellesley

Source: Dr. Khalid al-Izzi, THE SHATT AL-ARAB DISPUTE: A LEGAL STUDY, (London: Third World Centre for research and Publishing Ltd., 1981), pp.203-205.

APPENDIX III

THE TEHRAN PROTOCOL OF DECEMBER 21st, 1911

The Persian and Ottoman Governments, inspired by a common desire to avoid henceforward any subjects of controversy in respect of their common frontiers, having instructed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Turkish Ambassador at Tehran, respectively, to establish the bases of negotiations and the procedure to be followed for the delimitation of the said frontiers, the undersigned, after discussion, have agreed on the following points:

I. A Commission consisting of an equal number of delegates of either Party shall meet as early as possible at Constantinople.

II. The delegates of the two Governments, furnished with all the documents and evidence in support of their claims, shall be instructed to establish the boundary line separating the two countries in a spirit of sincere impartiality; after which, a technical commission shall have merely to apply the definite delimitation on the spot, on the basis laid down by the former commission.

III. The work of the Joint Commission, which will meet at Constantinople, shall be based on the clauses of the treaty known as the Treaty of Erzerum, concluded in 1847.

IV. Should the delegates of the two Parties fail to agree on the interpretation and application of certain clauses of that treaty, it is agreed that, at the end of a period of six months of negotiattion, in order completely to settle the question of the delimitation of the frontiers, all the points on which any divergence exists shall be submitted together to the Court of Arbitration at The Hague, in order that the entire question may thus be definitely settled.

V. It is understood that neither of the two Parties may adduce the military occupation of the territories in dispute as a legal argument.

Done in duplicate and exchanged in original between the undersigned, acting on behalf of their Governments.

The Imperial Ottoman Embassy, Tehran, December 21, 1911.

(signed) Wossughed-Dowleh

(signed) H. Hassib

APPENDIX IV
THE PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE DELIMITATION OF THE
TURCO-PERSIAN BOUNDARY SIGNED AT CONSTANTINOPLE
ON NOVEMBER 4th, 1913

The undersigned: His Excellency Sir Louis Mallet, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Britannic Majesty to His Majesty the Sultan; His Excellency Mirza Mahmud Khan Kajar Ahdi-Shamus Saltaneh, Ambassador Extraordinary and plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Shah of Persia to His Majesty the Sultan; His Excellency M. Michel de Giers, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia to His Majesty the Sultan; His Highness Prince Said Halim Pasha, Grand Vizier and Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire; have met for the purpose of recording in the present Protocol the Agreement concluded between their respective Governments with regard to the Turco-Persian boundary.

They began by recapitulating the progress, up to date, of the negotiations recently instituted among them.

The Joint Commission provided for in Article 1 of the Protocol signed at Tehran between the Imperial Ottoman Embassy and the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to determining the bases for the negotiations relating

to the delimitation of the Turco-Persian boundary held eighteen meetings, the first on May 12th and the last on August 9th, 1912.

On August 9th, 1912 the Imperial Russian Embassy at Constantinople addressed to the Sublime Porte, under No.264, a note stating that "the Imperial Government considers that too much emphasis cannot be laid on the necessity of putting into effect without delay the explicit stipulations of the Treaty of Erzerum, which are tantamount to the restoration of the status quo of 1848."

The imperial Embassy at the same time forwarded to the Imperial Ottoman Government a memorandum showing in detail the frontier-line in conformity with the stipulations of the treaties in force.

The Imperial Ottoman Government replied to this communication by a note dated March 18th, 1913, No.30469/47. It stated that:

"the Sublime Porte, being anxious to comply with the desire expressed by the Imperial Russian Government by eliminating any cause of difference in its cordial relations with the latter, and wishing, further, to demonstrate to the Persian Government its entire good faith in regard to the dispute existing on the subject between the two countries, has decided to accept the line mentioned in the aforesaid note and memorandum of the Ambassador of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia for the delimitation of the northern part of the Turco-Persian frontier from Serdar Bulak to Bane - that is to say, down to the 36th parallel of latitude."

Nevertheless, the Imperial Ottoman Government suggested a

number of modifications in the line proposed in the memorandum annexed to the note of the Imperial Russian Embassy dated August 9th, 1912, No.264.

The Imperial Ottoman Government also appended to its note "an explanatory note on the situation of the Zuhab boundaries and the arrangement that it would be able to accept in order to reach a final and equitable understanding with the Persian Government on that part of the frontier."

The Imperial Russian Embassy replied by a note dated March 28th, 1913, No.78. It noted the statement "by which the Imperial Ottoman Government recognizes as a principle for the delimitation of the Ararat-Bane section the exact sense of Article 3 of the Treaty of 1848, known as the Treaty of Erzerum, as set forth in the note of August 9th, 1912, No.264". As regards the modifications proposed by the Sublime Porte, the Imperial Embassy stated (with a reservation on the question of Egri-chai) that it could not sufficiently emphasize the necessity of making no change in the line established in its note of August 9th, 1912.

As regards the question of Zuhab, the Imperial Russian Embassy, while reserving the right to submit its detailed observations concerning that frontier, expressed "its opinion on the whole of the Ottoman draft, which does not seem to it to guarantee sufficiently, for the future, the maintenance of order and peace on the frontiers".

On April 20th, 1913, the Russian and British Embassies

addressed an identic note to His Highness Prince Said Halim Pasha, accompanied by a memorandum summarizing their point of view regarding the delimitation of Zuhab and the regions situate south of the district.

This exchange of notes was followed by conversations between their Excellencies M. de Giers and Sir Gerard Lowther, of the one part, and His Late Highness Mahmud Shefket Pasha, of the other part. The result of these conversations was recorded in an aide-memoire presented by His Excellency the Russian Ambassador to His Highness the Grand Vizier on June 6th, 1913, and a note from the Sublime Porte addressed on June 26th, 1913, No.34553/95, to the Russian Embassy, and on July 12th, 1913, to British Embassy.

On July 29th, 1913, a "declaration" was signed in London by Sir Edward Grey and His Highness Ibrahim Hakky Pasha concerning the demarcation of the southern boundary between Persia and Turkey.

The Imperial Russian Embassy then proceeded to recapitulate the principles of delimitation established in the correspondence concerning the Turco-Persian boundary. It addressed to the Sublime Porte a note dated August 5th, 1913, No.166. An identic note was addressed to the Sublime Porte by the British Embassy on the same date.

The Sublime Porte replied to these communications by identic notes dated September 23rd, 1913, No.37063/113.

As a result of the subsequent negotiations, the four

plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Persia, Russia and Turkey, agreed on the following provisions:

I

It is agreed that the boundary between Persia and Turkey shall be defined as follows:

The boundary in the north shall start from boundary-mark No. XXXVII on the Turco-Russian frontier, situate close to Serdar Bulak, on the crest between Little and Great Ararat. It shall then drop southwards by way of the ridges, leaving on the Persian side the valley of Dambat, Sarnvitch, and the water system of Yarym-Kaya, which rises to the south of Mount Ayubeg. The boundary shall then leave Bulakbashi, in Persia, and shall continue to follow the highest ridge, the southern extremity of which is situate at about 44 22' longitude and 30 28' latitude. Then, skirting the west side of the marsh which extends to the west of Yarym-Kaya, the boundary shall cross the Sary-Su stream, pass between the villages of Gride-baran (Turkish) and Bazyrgan (Persian), and, ascending to the ridge to the west of Bazyrgan, follow the watershed formed by the Saranli, Zenduli, Gir-Kelime, Kanly-baba, Geduki-Khasineh, and Deveji ridges.

After Deveji, the line shall cross the valley of Egri-chai at the place to be designated by the Delimitation Commission in conformity with the status quo, leaving the villages of Nado and Nifto in Persia.

The ownership of the village of Kyzyl-Kaya (Bellator) shall be established after an examination of the geographical situation of the village, the western side of the watershed in that region being allocated to Turkey, and the eastern side to Persia.

Should the final boundary line leave outside Ottoman territory a section of the road which passes close to Kyzyl-kaya and connects the district of Bayazid with the province of Van, it is understood that the Persian Government shall give free passage over this section of the road to the Imperial Ottoman posts and to travelers and goods, other than military troops and convoys.

The frontier shall then ascend to the ridges forming the watershed: Kyzyl-Ziaret Sarychimene, Dumanlu, Kara-burga, the hill between the reservoirs of Ayey-chai (Persian) and of Jelli-gol (Turkish), Avdal-dashi, Reshkan, the hill between Akhurek and Tavin Bevra-begzdan, Gevri-Mahine, Khydyr-baba, Avristan.

As regards Kotur, the Protocol of July 15th, 1880, known as the Protocol of Sary-Kamiche, shall be applied in such a way that the village of Kevlik shall remain in Turkey, and the villages of Bilejik, Razi, Gharatil (Haratil), the two Jelliks and Panamerik shall remain in Persia.

The frontier following the Mir-Omar ridge shall ascend the mountain of Surava, and leaving Khanyga on the Turkish side, shall pass by way of the watershed formed by the pass of

Borush-Khuran, the mountain of Haravil, Beleko, Shinetal, Sardul, Gulamli, Kepper, Bergabend, Peri-Khan, Iskander, Avene, and Kotul. The valley of Bajirga shall remain in Turkey, and the villages of Sartyk and Sero in Persia, and the frontier shall pass from the southern extremity of Kotur over the ridge rising to the west of the Persian village of Behik, and, following the peaks of Seri-Baydost, shall join the crest of Mount Zont.

From Mount Zont the frontier shall follow continuously the watershed between the Persian districts of Tergever, Desht, and Mergever, and the Turkish sanjak [district] of Hakkari - that is to say, the crests of Shiveh-Shishali, Chil-Chovri, Chel-Berdir, Kuna-Koter, Kazi-beg, Avukh, Mai-Helaneh, the mountains to the west of Binar and Delamper; then, leaving on the Persian side the basin emptying by way of Ushnu into the lake of Urumiya, including the sources of the Gadyr river known as Abiseri-gadyr (the valley of which is situated to the south of Delamper and to the east of Mount Girdeh), it shall reach the pass of Keleh-Shin.

To the south of Keleh-Shin the frontier shall leave on the Persian side the reservoir of Lavene, including the valley of Chumi-Geli (situate to the east of Zerdegel and to the south-west of Spi-rez), and on the Turkish side the waters of Revanduz, and shall pass by the following peaks and passes: Siah-Kuh, Zerdeh-Gel, Boz, Barzin, Ser-shiva, Kevi-Khoja-Ibrahim. Thence the frontier shall continue to

follow towards the south the main chain of Kandil, leaving on the Persian side the basin of the affluents of Kialu on the right side: the streams Purdanan Khydyrava and Talkhatan.

It is understood that the Turkish tribes which are in the habit of spending the summer in the said valleys at the Gadyr and Lavene springs shall still have the use of their pastures under the same conditions as in the past.

Having reached the summit of Seri-Kele-kelin, the line shall pass over Zinvi-Jasusan and the pass of Bamin, and shall cross the Vezne river near the Purde-Berdan bridge. The Delimitation Commission will have to decide as to the future of the village of Shenieh, on the bases of the general principle of the status quo.

After Purde-Berdan, the frontier shall ascend over the chains of Fokar-baba-kyr, Berde-spian, Berde-Abul-Fath and the pass of Kaniresht. It shall then follow the watershed formed by Lagav-Ghird, Donleri, the pass of Khan-Ahmed, and the southern extremity of Tepe-Salos. The frontier will thus pass between the villages of Kandol (Turkish) and Kesh-keshiva and Mazynava (Persian), and reach the course of the Kialu river (the little Zab).

After joining the course of the Kialu river, the frontier shall follow it upstream, leaving on the Persian side the right bank (the Alani-ajem) and on the Turkish side the left bank of the river. On reaching the mouth of the Khileh-resht river (an affluent of the Kialu on the left side), the

frontier shall follow the course of that river upstream, leaving on the Persian side the villages of Alot, Kovero, etc., and on the Turkish side the district Alani-Mavont. At the south-western extremity of Mount Balu, the frontier shall leave the course of the Hileh-resh river, and, ascending over the north-west extremity of the Surkew chain, extending to the south of the Hileh-resh river, shall pass over the Surkew ridge, leaving the districts of Siwel and Shive-Kel on the Turkish side.

On reaching the astronomical point of Surkew almost at latitude 35° 49', the frontier shall pass in the direction of the village of Champar-aw, the future of which shall be decided by the Delimitation Commission on the basis of the accepted principle of the status quo. The line shall then ascend over the chain of mountains which form the frontier between the Persian district of Baneh and the Turkish district of Kyzieja; Galash, Berdi-Kechel, Pusht-Hangajal, Du-bera, Parajal, and Spi-Kana, after which it shall reach the pass of Now-Khuvan. Thence, still following the watershed, the frontier shall turn southwards and then westwards, passing by way of the summits of Vul-Guza, Pushti-Shehidan, Hazar-Mal, Bali-Keder, Keleh-Melaik, and Kuhi-Koce-resha, separating the Turkish district of Teretul from the Persian district of Merivan.

From there, the frontier shall follow the course of the Khalil-Abad brook downstream as far as its confluence with

the Chami-Kyzylja, and then this last-named river upstream as far as the mouth of its left affluent flowing from the village of Bnava-Suta; it shall follow this Bnava-Suta brook upstream and, by way of the passes of Keli-Naveh-Sar and Keli-Piran, shall reach the pass of Surene, known, it appears, by the name of Chigan (or Chakan).

The main chain of Avroman, extending in the direction north-west/south-east, shall then form the frontier between Persia and the Ottoman district of Shehrisor. On reaching the peak of Kemadjar (south-east of Kala-Selm and north-west of Sheri-Avroman), the frontier shall continue to follow the main ridge as far as its ramification on the western side, rising to the north of the valley of Dere-Vuli, leaving the villages of Khan-Germela and Nowsud on the Persian side. For the remainder of the frontier as far as Sirvan, the Commission shall - by way of exception - delimit the ground, taking into consideration such changes as may have occurred there between the year 1848 and the year 1905.

South of Sirvan, the frontier shall begin close to the mouth of the Chami-Zimkan, shall pass by way of the Beyzel (Bezel) mountain, and shall descend to the Chami-Zerishk watercourse. Next, following the watershed between this last-named watercourse and the river which, rising in the Bend-Bemo, bears, according to the identic map, the name of Pushti-Gherav (Arkhevendu), it shall ascend to the summit of Bend-Bemo.

After following the ridge of Bamu (Bemo), the frontier, on reaching the defile of Derbendi-Dehul (Derbendi-Hur), shall follow the course of the Zengeneh (Abbasan) river as far as the point nearest to the summit of the Shevaldir (astronomical point) and situate below the village of Mamysan. It shall ascend this summit and shall next pass by way of the crests of the hills forming a watershed between the plans of Tileku and Serkaleh, then by way of the chains of Khuli-Baghan, Jebel-Ali-Beg, Bender-Chok-Chermik, Sengler, and Asengueran, as far as the point in the Tengi-Hammam defile situate opposite the northern extremity of the Karawiz mountains.

Thence the frontier shall follow the course of the river Kuretu as far as the village of that name. The future of the village of Kuretu shall be decided by the Delimitation Commission on the basis of the nationality of its inhabitants. Thence the frontier shall pass by way of the road between the villages of Kuretu and Kush-Kurrek, then along the crests of Mounts Kishka and Ak-Dag, and then, leaving Kala-Sedzi in Persia, it shall turn southwards as far as the Ottoman post of Kanibez. Thence it shall follow the course of the Elvend river upstream as far as the point a quarter of an hour's distance downstream from its confluence with the Gilan watercourse; from that point it shall continue as far as the Naft-Su, skirting the Ab-Bakhshan in accordance with the line agreed upon with the late Mahmud Shefket Pasha

and shown roughly on the map annexed to the note of the Imperial Russian Embassy dated August 5th, 1913, and leaving Naft-Mukataasy to Turkey. Thence, the frontier-line, following the Naft-Deressi, on reaching the point where the Kassri Shirin road cuts that waterway, shall continue along the mountains of Varbulend, Koherigh-Keleshuyan, and Jebel-Gerebi (the extension of the Jebeli-Hamrinach in).

The Delimitation Commission shall draw up a special agreement for the distribution of the Gengir (Sumar) waters between the parties concerned.

The part of the frontier between mendeli and the northern point of the line indicated in the declaration made in London on July 29th (Shuaib) between Hakky Pasha and Sir E. Grey not having yet been discussed in detail, the undersigned leave the establishment of that part of the frontier to the Delimitation Commission.

As regards delimitation from the region of Hawizeh as far as the sea, the frontier-line shall start from the place called Umm-Shir, where the Khor-el-Duvel divides from the Khor-el-Azem. Umm-Shir is situated east of the junction of the Khor-el-Muhaisin with the Khor-el-Azem, nine miles north-west of Bisaitin, a place situated at latitude 31 degrees 43'-29". From Umm-Shir, the line shall turn south-westwards as far as the longitude 45 degrees at the

southern extremity of a small lake known also by the name of Azem and situate in the Khor-el-Azem some distance north-west of Shuaib. From this point the line shall continue to the south along the marsh as far as latitude 31 degrees, which it shall follow directly eastwards as far as a point northeast of Kushk-i-Basra, so as to leave this place in Ottoman territory. From this point the line shall go southwards as far as the Khayeen canal at a point between the Nahr-Diaiji and the Nahr-Abu'l-Arabid; it shall follow the "medium filum aquae" of the Khayeen canal as far as the point where the latter joins the Shatt al-Arab, at the mouth of the Nahr-Nazaileh. From this point the frontier shall follow the course of the Shatt al-Arab as far as the sea, leaving under Ottoman sovereignty the river and all the islands therein, subject to the following conditions and exceptions:

(a) The following shall belong to Persia: (I) the Island of Muhalla and the two islands situate between the latter and the left bank of the Shatt al-Arab (Persian bank of Abadan); (II) the four islands between Shetait and Maawiyeh and the two islands opposite Mankuhi which are both dependencies of the island of Abadan; (III) any small islands now existing or that may be formed which are connected at low water with the island of Abadan or with Persian "terra firma" below Nahr-Nazaileh.

(b) The modern port and anchorage of Muhammara, above and below the junction of the river Karun with the Shatt al-Arab,

shall remain within Persian jurisdiction in conformity with the Treaty of Erzerum; the Ottoman right of usage of this part of the river shall not, however, be affected thereby, nor shall Persian jurisdiction extend to the parts of the river outside the anchorage.

(c) No change shall be made in the existing rights, usages and customs as regards fishing on the Persian bank of the Shatt al-Arab, the word "bank" including also the lands connected with the coast at low water.

(d) Ottoman jurisdiction shall not extend over the parts of the Persian coast that may be temporarily covered by water at high tide or by other accidental causes. Persian jurisdiction, on its side, shall not be exercised over lands that may be temporarily or accidentally uncovered when the water is below the normal low-water level.

(e) The Sheik of Muhammara shall continue to enjoy in conformity with the Ottoman laws his rights of ownership in ottoman territory.

The frontier-line established in the declaration is shown in red on the map annexed hereto.

The parts of the frontier not detailed in the above-mentioned frontier-line shall be established on the basis of the principle of the status quo, in conformity with the stipulations of Article 3 of the Treaty of Erzerum.

II

The frontier-line shall be delimited on the spot by a Delimitation Commission, consisting of commissioners of the four Governments.

Each Government shall be represented on this Commission by a commissioner's place on the Commission in case of need.

III

The Delimitation Commission, in the performance of the task devolving upon it, shall comply:

- (1) With the provisions of the present Protocol;
- (2) With the Rules of Procedure of the Delimitation Commission annexed (Annex A) to the present Protocol.

IV

In the event of a divergence of opinion in the Commission as to the boundary-line of any part of the frontier, the Ottoman and Persian commissioners shall submit a written statement of their respective points of view within forty-eight hours to the Russian and British Commissioners, who shall hold a private meeting and shall give a decision on the questions in dispute and communicate their decision to their Ottoman and Persian colleagues. This decision shall be inserted in the Minutes of the plenary meeting and shall be recognized as binding on all four Governments.

V

As soon as part of the frontier has been delimited, such part shall be regarded as finally fixed and shall not be liable to subsequent examination or revision.

VI

As the work of delimitation proceeds, the Ottoman and Persian Governments shall have the right to establish posts on the frontier.

VII

It is understood that the concession granted by the Convention of May 28th, 1901 by the Government of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia to William Knox D'Arcy and now being worked, in conformity with the provisions of Article 9 of the said Convention, by the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Limited), having its registered office at Winchester House, London (the said Convention being referred to hereunder as "the Convention" in the Annex B to the present Protocol), shall remain in full and unrestricted force throughout the territories transferred by Persia to Turkey in virtue of the provisions of the present Protocol and of Annex B thereto.

VIII

The Ottoman and Persian Governments will distribute among the officials on the frontier a sufficient number of copies of the delimitation map drawn up by the Commission, together with copies of translations of the statement provided for in Article XV of the Commission's Rules of Procedure. It is understood, however, that the French text alone shall be regarded as authentic.

(signed)

Louis Mallet

Ehtechamos-Saltaneh Mahmud

Michel de Giers

Said Halim

Source: Ministry of Education and Information, Selection From The Iraqi-Iranian Dispute, (Baghdad: Government Publication, 1983), pp.138-145.

APPENDIX V

FRONTIER TREATY BETWEEN THE KINGDOM OF IRAQ AND
THE EMPIRE OF IRAN WITH THE ANNEXED PROTOCOL
SIGNED ON JULY 4th, 1937 IN TEHRAN

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ, of one part,
HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE SHAHINSHAH OF IRAN, of the other
part,

Sincerely desirous of consolidating the bonds of
brotherly friendship and good understanding between the two
States, and in order to settle definitely the frontier
question between their two countries, have decided to
conclude the present Treaty and for this purpose have
appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING OF IRAQ;

HIS Excellency Dr. Naji Al-Asil

Minister for Foreign Affairs

HIS IMPERIAL MAJESTY THE SHAHINSHAH OF IRAN;

His Excellency Enayatollah Samiy

Minister for Foreign Affairs

who, having exchanged their full power, found in good and due
form, have agreed on the following:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties agree that the following

documents, with the exception of the modification specified in Article 2 of the present Treaty, are considered valid and that They are bound to observe them:

(a) The Protocol relating to the Turko-Persian Delimitation signed at Constantinople on November 4, 1913;

(b) The Proceedings of the Commission of Delimitation of the Frontier of 1914.

Having regard to the provisions of this Article and with the exception of the provisions made in the next following Article; the boundary line between the two States is that defined and traced by the above-mentioned Commission.

ARTICLE 2

The boundary line on reaching the furthest point of Shoteit Island (approximately latitude 30 17'25" North, longitude 48 19'28" East) rejoins, in a line drawn prependiculary to the low-water mark, the thalweg of Shatt al-Arab and follows it as far as a point situated opposite the existing jetty No.1 of Abadan (approximately latitude 30 20'8.4" North, longitude 48 16'13" East). From this point the boundary line rejoins the line of low-water and follows the tracing of the frontier as described in the Proceedings of 1914.

ARTICLE 3

Immediately after the signature of the present treaty the

High Contracting Parties shall appoint a Commission for the purpose of erecting frontier pillars, the location of which has been fixed by the Commission mentioned in paragraph (b) of Article 1 of the present treaty and of fixing additional pillars, which it considers useful to erect.

The composition of the Commission and the program of its work shall be fixed by a special arrangement between the two High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 4

The following provisions shall apply to the Shatt al-Arab from the point where the land frontier of the two States descends into the said river as far as the open sea:

(a) The Shatt al-Arab shall remain open to merchant ships of all countries equally. All dues levied shall be in the nature of payment for services rendered and intended solely to cover, in an equitable manner, the expenses of maintaining the navigability and improving the navigable channel and the approach of the Shatt al-Arab from the seaward side, or to meet expenditures incurred in the interest of navigation. The said dues shall be calculated on the basis of the official tonnage of ships or their draught, or both together.

(b) The Shatt al-Arab shall remain open to the passage of war ships and other vessels belonging to the two High Contracting Parties used for non-commercial purposes.

(c) The fact that in the Shatt al-Arab the boundary line sometimes follows the low-water mark and sometimes the thalweg or the "medium filum aquae" does not prejudice in any way the two High Contracting Parties' right of user in the whole course of the river.

ARTICLE 5

The two High Contracting Parties, having a common interest in the navigation of the Shatt al-Arab as defined in Article 4 of the present Treaty, undertake to conclude a convention concerning the maintenance and improvement of the navigable channel, dredging, pilotage, dues to be levied, sanitary measures, measures to be taken for the prevention of smuggling, and all other matters relating to navigation in the Shatt al-Arab as defined in Article 4 of the present Treaty.

ARTICLE 6

The present treaty shall be ratified and the instruments of ratification shall be exchanged at Baghdad as soon as possible. It shall come into force as from the day when this exchange takes place.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries of the two High Contracting Parties have signed the present Treaty.

Done at Tehran, in Arabic, Persian and French, of which, in case of difference, the French text shall prevail, the fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven.

(signed) Naji Al-Asil

(signed) Samiy

PROTOCOL

At the time of proceeding to the signing of the Treaty concerning the delimitation of the boundaries between Iraq and Iran, the two High Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:

I

The geographical coordinates shown approximately in Article 2 of the above-mentioned Treaty shall be definitely fixed by a Commission of experts composed of an equal number of members nominated by each of the High Contracting Parties.

The geographical coordinates so determined definitely within the limits fixed in above-mentioned Article shall be recorded in Minutes, which after having been signed by the

members of the above-mentioned Commission, shall be an integral part of the Frontier Treaty.

II

The High Contracting Parties undertake to conclude the convention mentioned in Article 5 of the Treaty in the course of one year from the entry into force of the Treaty.

If, notwithstanding the efforts exerted by them, this convention is not concluded in the course of the year, this period may be extended by common agreement of the High Contracting Parties.

The Imperial Government of Iran agrees that during the period of one year mentioned in the first paragraph of this article and during the extension of this period, if this extension takes place, the Royal Government of Iraq shall undertake on the bases now in force all matters which are to be dealt with by this Convention. The Royal Government of Iraq shall, by means of biannual communications, keep the Imperial Government of Iran informed of the works carried out, the dues levied, the expenses incurred and of all other measures taken.

III

The authorization given by one of the High Contracting

Parties to a war ship or other public vessel used for non-commercial purposes belonging to a third State to enter ports belonging to the said High Contracting Party and situated on the Shatt al-Arab shall be regarded as having been given by the other High Contracting Party in order that such vessel may make use of its waters when passing through the Shatt al-Arab.

Nevertheless, that High Contracting Party who has given such an authorization must inform the other Party thereof immediately.

IV

It is understood that subject to the rights of Iran in Shatt al-Arab, nothing in this Treaty prejudices the rights of Iraq and its obligations undertaken towards the British Government regarding the Shatt al-Arab in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty dated June 30, 1930, and paragraph 7 of its Annexure, signed on the same day.

V

The present Protocol shall be ratified at the same time as the Treaty concerning the delimitation of the frontiers of which it shall form, as an Annexure, an integral part. It shall come into force at the same time as this Treaty.

The present Protocol is made in Arabic, Persian and

French. In case of difference, the French text shall prevail.

Done at Tehran in duplicate, on the fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and thirty seven.

(signed) Naji Al-Asil

(signed) Samiy

Source: League of Nations, Treaty Series, CXC, nos.4401-3 (1938).

APPENDIX VI

ALGERIA DECLARATION OF MARCH 6th, 1975. JOINT
COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN

During the meeting in Algeria of the Summit Conference of the Member Countries of OPEC and on the initiative of President Houari Boumedienne, His Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran and H. E. Saddam Hussein, Vice Chairman of the Revolution Command Council of Iraq, held two meetings and had lengthy discussions on the subject of relations between the two countries.

These meetings, which took place in the presence of President Boumedienne, were marked by great frankness and a sincere wish on both sides to reach a final and permanent solution to all the problems existing between the two countries.

In application of the principles of territorial integrity, the inviolability of borders and non-interference in internal affairs, the two contractual parties have decided:

1. To effect a definitive demarcation of their land frontiers on the basis of the Protocol of Constantinople, 1913, and the Proceedings of the Border Delimitation Commission of 1914.

2. To delimit their fluvial frontiers according to the THALWEG line.

3. Accordingly, the two parties will restore security and mutual trust along their common boundaries, and hence will commit themselves to exercising a strict and effective control over their common boundaries with a view to putting a definitive end to all acts of infiltration of a subversive character no matter where they originate from.

4. The two parties also agreed to consider the arrangements referred to above as integral elements of a comprehensive solution. Hence any impairment of any of their components shall naturally be contrary to the spirit of the Algeria Agreement.

The two parties will remain in permanent touch with President Boumedienne, who will offer, in case of need, the fraternal assistance of Algeria to implement the decisions which have been taken.

The parties have decided to reestablish traditional ties of good neighborliness and friendship, particularly by the elimination of all negative factors in their relations, the continuous exchange of views on questions of mutual interest and the development of mutual cooperation.

The two parties solemnly declare that the area should be

kept free from any outside interference.

The Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Iran and Iraq shall meet in the presence of the Algerian Foreign Minister on 15 March 1975 in Tehran to fix the details of work for the Joint Iraqi-Iranian Commission created to implement the decisions reached above by mutual agreement.

In accordance with the wishes of both parties, Algeria will be invited to all the meetings of the Joint Iraq-Iranian Commission.

The Joint Commission will draw up its timetable and work-plan so as to meet, in case of need, alternatively in Baghdad and Tehran.

His Majesty the Shahinshah has accepted with pleasure the invitation which has been conveyed to him, on behalf of H. E. President Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakr, to make an official visit to Iraq; the date of this visit will be fixed by mutual agreement.

Furthermore, H. E. Saddam Hussein has agreed to make an official visit to Iran on a date to be agreed between the two parties.

His Majesty the Shahinshah and H. E. Vice President Saddam Hussein wish to thank particularly and warmly President Houari Boumedienne who, acting from fraternal and

disinterested motives, has facilitated the establishment of direct contacts between the leaders of the two countries and, as a result, has contributed to the establishment of a new era in relations between Iran and Iraq in the higher interest of the future of the region concerned.

Algeria, 6 March 1975

Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Iraqi-Iranian Conflict: Documentary Dossier, (Baghdad: January 1981).

APPENDIX VII

TREATY OF INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES AND GOOD
NEIGHBORLINESS BETWEEN IRAQ AND IRAN
WITH THE ANNEXED PROTOCOLS
SIGNED ON JUNE 13th, 1975

His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran,

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq,

Considering the sincere desire of the two Parties as expressed in the Algeria Agreement of 6 March, 1975, to achieve a final and lasting solution to all the problems pending between the two countries,

Considering that the two Parties have carried out the definitive redemarcation of their land frontier on the basis of the Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of the meetings of the Frontier Delimitation Commission of 1914 and have delimited their river frontier along the Thalweg,

Considering their desire to restore security and mutual trust throughout the length of their common frontier,

Considering the ties of geographical proximity, history, religion, culture and civilization which bind the peoples of Iran and Iraq,

Desirous of strengthening their bonds of friendship and good neighborliness, expanding their economic and cultural

relations and promoting exchanges and human relations between their peoples on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity, the inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in the internal affairs of others,

Resolved to work towards the introduction of a new era of friendly relations between Iran and Iraq based on full respect for the national independence and sovereignty equality of States,

Convinced that they are helping thereby to implement the principles and to achieve the purposes and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have decided to conclude this Treaty and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

His Imperial Majesty the Shahinshah of Iran:

His Excellency Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran.

His Excellency the President of the Republic of Iraq:

His Excellency Saadoun Hammadi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq.

Who, having exchanged their full powers, found to be in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State land frontier between Iraq and Iran shall be that which has been

redemarcated on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol concerning the redemarcation of the land frontier, and the annexes thereto, attached to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

The High Contracting Parties confirm that the State frontier in the Shatt al-Arab shall be that which has been delimited on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol concerning the delimitation of the river frontier, and the annexes thereto, attached to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

The High Contracting Parties undertake to exercise a strict and effective permanent control over the frontier in order to put an end to any infiltration of a subversive nature from any source, on the basis of and in accordance with the provisions of the Protocol concerning frontier security, and the annex thereto, attached to this Treaty.

ARTICLE 4

The High Contracting Parties confirm that the provisions of the three Protocols, and the annexes thereto, referred to in Articles 1, 2 and 3 above and attached to this Treaty as an integral part thereof, shall be final and permanent. They

shall not be infringed under any circumstances and shall constitute the indivisible elements of an over-all settlement. Accordingly, a breach of any of the components of this over-all settlement shall clearly be incompatible with the spirit of the Algeria Agreement.

ARTICLE 5

In keeping with the inviolability of the frontiers of the two States and the strict respect for their territorial integrity, the High Contracting Parties confirm that the course of their land and river frontiers shall be inviolable, permanent and final.

ARTICLE 6

1. In the event of a dispute regarding the interpretation or implementation of this Treaty, the three Protocols or the annexes thereto, any solution to such a dispute shall strictly respect the course of the Iraqi-Iranian frontier referred to in Articles 1 and 2 above, and shall take into account the need to maintain security on the Iraqi-Iranian frontier in accordance with Article 3 above.

2. Such disputes shall be resolved in the first instance by the High Contracting Parties, by means of direct bilateral negotiations to be held within two months after the date on which one of the Parties so requested.

3. If no agreement is reached, the High Contracting

Parties shall have recourse, within a three-month period, to the good offices of a friendly Third State.

4. Should one of the two Parties refuse to have recourse to good offices or should the good offices procedure fail, the dispute shall be settled by arbitration within a period of not more than one month after the date of such refusal or failure.

5. Should the High Contracting Parties disagree as to the arbitration procedure, one of the High Contracting Parties may have recourse, within 15 days after such disagreement was recorded, to a court of arbitration.

With a view to establishing such a court of arbitration each of the High Contracting Parties shall, in respect of each dispute to be resolved appoint one of its nationals as arbitrators and the two arbitrators shall choose an umpire. Should the High Contracting Parties fail to appoint their arbitrators within one month after the date on which one of the Parties received a request for arbitration from the other Party, or should the arbitrators fail to reach agreement on the choice of the umpire before that time-limit expires, the High Contracting Party which requested arbitration shall be entitled to request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint the arbitrators or the umpire, in accordance with the procedures of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

6. The decision of the court of arbitration shall be

binding and enforceable by the High Contracting Parties.

7. The High Contracting Parties shall each defray half the costs of arbitration.

ARTICLE 7

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the Annexes thereto, shall be registered in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 8

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the Annexes thereto, shall be ratified by each of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with its domestic law.

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the annexes thereto shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of the instruments of ratification in Tehran.

In witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries of the High Contracting Parties have signed this Treaty, the three Protocols and the Annexes thereto.

Done at Baghdad, on June 13, 1975.

(signed)
Abbas Ali Khalatbary
Minister for
Foreign Affairs
of Iran

(signed)
Saadoun Hammadi
Minister for
Foreign Affairs
of Iraq

This Treaty, the three Protocols and the Annexes thereto, were signed in the Presence of His Excellency Abdel-Aziz

Bouteflika, Member of the Council of the Revolution and
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Algeria.

(signed)

PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE REDEMARCATION OF THE
LAND FRONTIER BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ

Pursuant to the provisions of the Algeria communique of
March 6, 1975, the two Contracting Parties have agreed as
follows:

ARTICLE 1

A. The two Contracting Parties affirm and recognize that the
redemarcation of the State land frontier between Iran and
Iraq was a field operation performed by the mixed
Iraqi-Iranian-Algerian Committee on the basis of the
following:

1. The Constantinople Protocol of 1913 and the minutes of
the meetings of the Turco-Persian frontier;

2. The Tehran Protocol dated March 17, 1975;

3. The record of the meeting of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, signed at Baghdad on April 20, 1975 and approving,
"inter alia", the record of the Committee to Demarcate the
Land Frontier, signed at Tehran on March 30, 1975;

4. The record of the meeting of Ministers of Foreign

Affairs, signed at Algeria on May 20, 1975;

5. The descriptive record of operations in the demarcation of the land frontier between Iran and Iraq, prepared by the Committee to Demarcate the Land Frontier and dated June 13, 1975. The record constitutes Annex 1 and is an integral part of this Protocol;

6. Maps on the scale 1:50,000 indicating the land frontier line and the position of the old and new frontier marks. The maps constitute Annex 2 and are an integral part of this Protocol;

7. Record cards of the old and new frontier marks;

8. A document giving the coordinates of the frontier marks;

9. Aerial photographs of the Iraqi-Iranian frontier strip indicating the positions of the old and new frontier marks.

B. The two Parties undertake to complete the demarcation of the frontier between frontier marks No.14A and No.15 within two months.

C. The two Contracting Parties shall cooperate in producing aerial photographs of the Iranian-Iraqi land frontier with a view to using them in plotting the frontier on maps scaled 1:25,000 indicating the position of the frontier marks. This work shall be completed within a period not exceeding one year taking effect May 20, 1975, and shall be without prejudice to the entry into force of the Treaty of which this Protocol is an integral part.

The descriptive record relating to the land frontier and referred to in paragraph 5 above shall be amended accordingly.

The maps produced pursuant to the present section C shall supersede all existing maps.

ARTICLE 2

The State land frontier between Iraq and Iran shall follow the line indicated in the descriptive record and the maps referred to respectively in paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 1 above, with due regard to the provisions of section C of that Article.

ARTICLE 3

The frontier line defined in Articles 1 and 2 of this Protocol shall also divide the air space and the subsoil vertically.

ARTICLE 4

The two Contracting Parties shall establish a Mixed Iraqi-Iranian Commission to settle, in a neighborly and cooperative spirit, the status of landed property, constructions, or technical or other installations whose national character may be changed by the redemarcation of the land frontier between Iraq and Iran. Such settlement shall be by means of repurchase compensation or any other appropriate formula, with a view to eliminating any source of

litigation.

The Commission shall settle the status of State property within two months. Claims concerning private property shall be submitted to it within two months. The status of this private property shall be settled within the following three months.

ARTICLE 5

1. A Mixed Commission composed of representatives of the competent authorities of the two States shall be established to inspect the frontier marks and determine their condition.

The Commission shall make this inspection annually, in September, in accordance with a timetable which it shall prepare beforehand within an appropriate period of time.

2. Either Contracting Party may request the other in writing to have the Commission carry out, at any time, an additional inspection of the frontier marks. In the event of such a request, the inspection shall be made within a period not exceeding 30 days after the date of the request.

3. Whenever an inspection is made, the Mixed Commission shall prepare the relevant reports and submit them under its signature to the competent authorities of each of the two States. The Commission may, if need be, call for the construction of new frontier marks according to the specifications of the existing ones, provided that the course of the frontier line is not thereby altered. Where new

frontier marks are constructed, the competent authorities of the two States shall check the frontier marks and their coordinates against the relevant maps and documents referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol. The authorities shall then position the frontier-marks under the supervision of the Mixed Commission, which shall prepare a record of the operation and submit it to the competent authorities of each of the two States, so that it may be annexed to the documents referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol.

4. The two Contracting Parties shall be jointly responsible for the maintenance of the frontier marks.

5. The Mixed Commission shall be responsible for replacing displaced frontier marks and reconstructing destroyed or missing marks, on the basis of the maps and documents referred to in Article 1 of this Protocol, taking care not to alter the position of the marks, under any circumstances. In such cases, the Mixed Commission shall prepare a record of the operation and submit it to the competent authorities of each of the two States.

6. The competent authorities of each of the two States shall exchange information on the condition of the frontier marks with a view to finding the best ways and means of protecting and maintaining them.

7. The two Contracting Parties undertake to take all necessary steps to protect the frontier marks and prosecute individuals who have moved, damaged or destroyed them.

ARTICLE 6

The two Contracting Parties have agreed that the provisions of this Protocol, signed without any reservation, shall henceforth govern any matter relating to the frontier between Iran and Iraq. On this basis, they solemnly undertake to respect their common and definitive frontier.

(signed)
 Abbas Ali Khalatbary
 Minister for
 Foreign Affairs
 of Iran

(signed)
 Saadoun Hammadi
 Minister for
 Foreign Affairs
 of Iraq

Signed in the presence of His Excellency Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, Member of the Council of the Revolution, and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.

(signed)

PROTOCOL CONCERNING THE DELIMITATION
 OF THE RIVER FRONTIER BETWEEN
 IRAN AND IRAQ

Pursuant to the decisions taken in the Algeria Communique of March 6, 1975,

The two Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The two Contracting Parties hereby declare and recognize

that the State river frontier between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt al-Arab has been delimited along the Thalweg by the Mixed Iraqi-Iranian-Algerian Committee on the basis of the following:

1. The Tehran Protocol of March 17, 1975;
2. The record of the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, signed at Baghdad on April 20, 1975, approving, "inter alia", the record of the Committee to Delimit the River Frontier, signed on April 16, 1975 on board the Iraqi ship "El Thawra" in the Shatt al-Arab;
3. Common hydrographic charts, which have been verified on the spot and corrected and on which the geographical co-ordinates of the 1975 frontier crossing points have been indicated; these charts have been signed by the hydrographic experts of the Mixed Technical Commission and countersigned by the heads of the Iranian, Iraqi and Algerian delegations to the Committee. The said charts, listed hereafter, are annexed to this Protocol and form an integral part thereof:

Chart No.1: Entrance to the Shatt al-Arab, No.3842, published by the British Admiralty;

Chart No.2: Inner Bar to Kabda point, No.3843, published by the British Admiralty;

Chart No.3: Kabda point to Abadan, No.3844, published by the British Admiralty;

Chart No.4: Abadan to Jazirat Ummat Tuwaylah, No.3845, published by the British Admiralty.

ARTICLE 2

1. The frontier line in the Shatt al-Arab shall follow the Thalweg, i.e., the median line of the main navigable channel at the lowest navigable level, starting from the point at which the land frontier between Iran and Iraq enters the Shatt al-Arab and continuing to the sea.

2. The frontier line, as defined in paragraph 1 above, shall vary with changes brought about by natural causes in the main navigable channel. The frontier line shall not be affected by other changes unless the two Contracting Parties conclude a special agreement to that effect.

3. The occurrence of any of the changes referred to in paragraph 2 above shall be attested jointly by the competent technical authorities of the two Contracting Parties.

4. Any change in the bed of the Shatt al-Arab brought about by natural causes which would involve a change in the national character of the two States' respective territories or of landed property, constructions, or technical or other

installations, shall not change the course of the frontier line, which shall continue to follow the Thalweg in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 above.

5. Unless an agreement is reached between the two Contracting Parties concerning the transfer of the frontier line to the new bed, the water shall be re-directed at the joint expense of both Parties to the bed existing in 1975 - as marked on the four common charts listed in Article 1, Paragraph 3, above - should one of the Parties so request within two years after the date on which the occurrence of the change was attested by either of the two Parties. Until such time, both Parties shall retain their previous right of navigation and of use over the water of the new bed.

ARTICLE 3

1. The river frontier between Iran and Iraq in the Shatt al-Arab, as defined in Article 2 above, is represented by the relevant line drawn on the common charts referred to in Article 1, paragraph 3, above.

2. The two Contracting Parties have agreed to consider that the river frontier shall end at the straight line connecting the two banks of the Shatt al-Arab, at its mouth, at the astronomical lowest-water mark. This straight line has been indicated on in Article 1, paragraph 3, above.

ARTICLE 4

The frontier line as defined in Articles 1, 2 and 3 of this Protocol shall also divide vertically the air space and the subsoil.

ARTICLE 5

With a view to eliminating any source of controversy, the two Contracting Parties shall establish a Mixed Iraqi-Iranian Commission to settle, within two months, any questions concerning the status of landed property, constructions, or technical or other installations, the national character of which may be affected by the delimitation of the Iranian-Iraqi river frontier, either through repurchase or compensation or any other suitable arrangement.

ARTICLE 6

Since the task of surveying the Shatt al-Arab has been completed and the common hydrographic chart referred to in Article 1, paragraph 3, above has been drawn up, the two Contracting parties have agreed that a new survey of the Shatt al-Arab shall be carried out jointly, once every 10 years, with effect from the date of signature of this Protocol. However, each of the two Parties shall have the right to request new surveys, to be carried out jointly, before the expiry of the 10-year period.

The two Contracting Parties shall each defray half the cost of such surveys.

ARTICLE 7

1. Merchant vessels, State vessels and warships of the two Contracting Parties shall enjoy freedom of navigation in the Shatt al-Arab and in any part of the navigable channels in the territorial sea which lead to the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab, irrespective of the line delimiting the territorial sea of each of the two countries.

2. Vessels of third countries used for purposes of trade shall enjoy freedom of navigation, on an equal and non-discriminatory basis, in the Shatt al-Arab in any part of the navigable Channels in the territorial sea which lead to the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab, irrespective of the line delimiting the territorial seas of each of the two countries.

3. Either of the two Contracting Parties may authorize foreign warships visiting its ports to enter the Shatt al-Arab, provided such vessels do not belong to a country in a state of belligerency, armed conflict or war with either of the two Contracting Parties, and provided the other Party is so notified no less than 72 hours in advance.

4. The two Contracting Parties shall in every case refrain from authorizing the entry to the Shatt al-Arab of merchant vessels belonging to a country in a state of belligerency, armed conflict or war with either of the two parties.

ARTICLE 8

1. Rules governing navigation in the Shatt al-Arab shall be drawn up by a mixed Iranian-Iraqi Commission, in accordance with the principle of equal rights of navigation for both States.

2. The two Contracting Parties shall establish a Commission to draw up rules governing the prevention and control of pollution in the Shatt al-Arab.

3. The two Contracting Parties undertake to conclude subsequent agreements on the questions referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article.

ARTICLE 9

The two Contracting Parties recognize that the Shatt al-Arab is primarily an international waterway, and undertake to refrain from any operation that might hinder navigation in the Shatt al-Arab or in any part of those navigable channels

in the territorial sea of either of the two countries that lead to the mouth of the Shatt al-Arab.

Done at Baghdad, on June 13, 1975.

(signed)
 Abbas Ali Khalatbary
 Minister for
 Foreign Affairs
 of Iran

(signed)
 Saadoun Hammadi
 Minister for
 Foreign Affairs
 of Iraq

Signed in the presence of His Excellency Abdel-Aziz Bouteflika, Member of the Council Revolution and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Algeria.

(signed)

PROTOCOL CONCERNING SECURITY ON THE FRONTIER BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ

In accordance with the decisions contained in the Algeria Agreement of March 6, 1975,

Anxious to re-establish mutual security and trust throughout the length of their common frontier,

Resolved to exercise strict and effective control over that frontier in order to put an end to any infiltration of a subversive nature, and, to that end, to establish close cooperation between themselves and to prevent any

infiltration or illegal movement across their common frontier for the purpose of causing subversion, insubordination or rebellion,

Referring to the Tehran Protocol of March 15, 1975, the record of the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, signed in Baghdad on April 20, 1975, and the record of the meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Signed in Algeria on May 20, 1975,

The two Contracting Parties have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

1. The two Contracting Parties shall exchange information on any movement by subversive elements which may attempt to infiltrate one of the two countries with a view to committing acts of subversion, insubordination or rebellion.

2. The two Contracting Parties shall take the necessary steps with regard to the movements of the elements referred to in paragraph 1 above.

They shall inform each other immediately of the identity of such persons, on the understanding that they shall do their utmost to prevent those persons from committing acts of subversion.

The same steps shall be taken with regard to any persons who may assemble within the territory of one of the two Contracting Parties with the intention of committing acts of subversion or sabotage in the territory of the other Party.

ARTICLE 2

The many forms of cooperation established between the competent authorities of the two Contracting Parties relating to the closing of frontiers to prevent infiltration by subversive elements shall be instituted by the frontier authorities of the two countries, and shall be pursued up to the highest levels in the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and the Interior of each of the two Parties.

ARTICLE 3

The infiltration points likely to be used by subversive elements are as follows:

1. Northern frontier zone:

From the point of intersection of the Iranian, Turkish and Iraqi frontiers to (and including) Khanaqin-Qasr-e-Shirin: 21 points.

2. Southern frontier zone:

From (but not including) Khanaqin-Qasr-e-Shirin to the end

of the Iranian-Iraqi frontier: 17 points.

3. The above infiltration points are named in the annex.

4. The points specified above shall be supplemented by any other infiltration point which may be discovered and will have to be closed and controlled.

5. All frontier crossing points except those currently controlled by the customs authorities shall be closed.

6. In the interest of promoting relations of all kinds between the two neighboring countries, the two Contracting Parties have agreed that, in the future, other crossing points controlled by the customs authorities shall be created by common consent.

ARTICLE 4

1. The two Contracting Parties undertake to provide the necessary human and material resources to ensure the effective closure and control of their frontiers, so as to prevent any infiltration by subversive elements through the crossing points mentioned in Article 3 above.

2. If, in the light of experience gained in this matter, experts should decide that more effective measures must be

taken, the corresponding procedures shall be established at monthly meetings of the frontier authorities of the two countries, or at meetings between those authorities, should the need arise.

The conclusion and records of such meetings shall be communicated to the higher authorities of each of the two Parties. Should there be disagreement between the frontier authorities, the heads of the administrations concerned shall meet in either Baghdad or Tehran to reconcile the points of view and draw up a record of the outcome of their meetings.

ARTICLE 5

1. Any subversive persons who may be arrested shall be handed over to the competent authorities of the Party in whose territory they were arrested and shall be subject to the legislation in force.
2. The two Contracting Parties shall inform one another of the measures taken against persons referred to in paragraph 1 above.
3. Should subversive persons cross the frontier in an attempt to escape, the authorities of the other country shall be informed immediately and shall take all necessary steps to apprehend such persons.

ARTICLE 6

In case of need and where the two Contracting Parties so agree, entry to certain areas may be declared prohibited in order to prevent subversive persons from carrying out their intentions.

ARTICLE 7

In order to establish and promote cooperation which is mutually beneficial to both Parties, a permanent Mixed Committee comprising the heads of the frontier authorities and representatives of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the two countries shall be established and shall hold two sessions a year (at the beginning of each of the calendar).

At the request of one of the two Parties, however, special meetings may be held to consider how intellectual and material resources might be better used for the closure and control of the frontiers and to review the effectiveness and proper implementation of the basic provisions governing cooperation as provided for in this Protocol.

ARTICLE 8

The provisions of this Protocol relating to the closure and control of the frontier shall be without prejudice to the provisions of specific agreements between Iran and Iraq

concerning grazing rights and frontier commissioners.

ARTICLE 9

With a view to guaranteeing the security of the common river frontier in the Shatt al-Arab and preventing the infiltration of subversive elements from either side, the two Contracting Parties shall take such appropriate steps as the installation of lookout posts and the detachment of patrol boats.

Done at Baghdad, on June 13, 1975.

(signed)
Abbas Ali Khalatbary
Minister for
Foreign Affairs
of Iran

(signed)
Saadoun Hammadi
Minister for
Foreign Affairs
of Iraq

Signed in the presence of His Excellency A. A. Bouteflika,
Member of the Council Revolution and Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Algeria.

(Signed)

Source: Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Iraqi-Iranian Conflict: Documentary Dossier, (January 1981).

APPENDIX VIII

TEXT OF 17 SEPTEMBER 1980 IRAQI REVOLUTION COMMAND COUNCIL
DECISION ABROGATING THE 6 MARCH 1975 AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

In according with the provisions of paragraph A of Article 42 of the Provisional Constitution and in view of the Iranian Government's violation of the letter and spirit of the 6 March 1975 Agreement and the attached protocols by not honoring the good-neighbor relations, by blatantly and purposefully interfering in Iraq's domestic affairs and by failing to return the usurped Iraqi territories to full Iraqi sovereignty under the above-mentioned agreement, which shows that Iran considers the March, 1975 agreement as null and void, the Revolution Command Council, meeting on 17 September 1980, has decided to consider that agreement as abrogated and to restore complete legal and effective sovereignty over Shatt al-Arab.

Accordingly, the Revolution Command Council has decided the following:

1. To abrogate Law No 69 of 1976 ratifying the treaty on the international borders and good neighborliness concluded between the Government of the Iraqi Republic and the Iranian Government and the three attached protocols with their

annexes signed in Baghdad on 13 June 1975, the four attached agreements with their annexes signed in Baghdad on 26 September 1975 and the letters and joint minutes which were exchanged.

2. This decision shall go into effect as of the date of its issuance and shall be published in the official gazette. The competent ministers shall implement it.

(signed)

Saddam Hussein, chairman of the Revolution Command Council

ABBREVIATIONS

AA: antiaircraft
AAM: air-to-air missile
AC&W: air control and warning
ADC: army air defense control
AEW&C: airborne early warning and control
AFB: air force base
AFV: armored fighting vehicle
ARM: antiradiation missile
ASM: air-to-surface missile
ASW: antisubmarine warfare
ATC: air traffic control
ATGM: antitank guided missile
ATGW: antitank guided weapon
EW: electronic warfare
FGA: fighter ground attack
GCI: ground-controlled intercept
HAWK: surface-to-air missile
IFV: infantry fighting vehicle
LAV: light armored vehicle
LCAC: air-cushioned landing craft
LSM: landing ship medium
LST: landing ship tank
SAM: surface-to-air missile
SSM: surface-to-surface missile

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
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
MAP 1 **THE SHATT al ARAB AREA**



SOURCE: CIA 503692 4-78 (54J694)


Taken from Anthony H. Cordesman, "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability", (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc., 1984), P.647.

MAP #2




Taken from Tareq Y. Ismael, "Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflicts", (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), P.4.

MAP #3




Taken from Tareq Y. Ismael, "Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflicts", (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), P.7.

MAP #4



Taken from Ministry of Education and Information, "Selections from The Iraqi-Iranian Dispute", (Baghdad: Government Publications, 1983).

MAP #5




Taken from Ministry of Education and Information, "Selections from The Iraqi-Iranian Dispute", (Baghdad: Government Publications, 1983).

MAP #6: The Northern Iraq Border




Taken from Edmund Ghareeb, "The Kurdish Question In Iraq", (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1981).

MAP #7



Taken from Tareq Y. Ismael, "Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflicts", (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1982), P.23.

MAP 8: THE LAND FRONTIER DISPUTE




Taken from Dr. Khalid al-Izzi, "The Shatt Al-Arab Dispute: A Legal Study", (London: Third World Centre for Research and Publishing Ltd., 1981), pp.242-243.

MAP 9




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
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Taken from M. S. El-Azhary, Ed., "The Iran-Iraq War", (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1984), P.24.


MAP 12
THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF BAHRAIN



Adapted from CIA 626961 4-80


TAKEN FROM ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, "THE GULF AND THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY" (BOULDER, COLORADO: WESTVIEW PRESS, 1984), P. 582.

MAP 13



TAKEN FROM TAREQ Y. ISMAEL, "IRAQ AND IRAN: ROOTS OF CONFLICTS",
(SYRACUSE, NEW YORK: SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 1982), P 21.


MAP 14 IRAN



SOURCE CIA 504190 (544499) 7-79

Taken from A. H. Cordesman, "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability", (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p.731.

MAP 15 IRAQ



SOURCE CIA 504065 3-79 (544444)

Taken from A. H. Cordesman, "The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability", (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 742

TABLE 1 The Military Buildup in Iran, 1972-1983

	1973-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83
Total population (millions)	30.5	30.8	32.2	33.18	33.8	34.76	36.37	39.3	38.25	39.67	39.1
Defense expenditures (billions)	0.915	2.01	3.225	10.405	9.5	7.9	9.94	3.79	4.2	4.2	n.a.
GNP (\$ billions)	15.09	22.5	35.6	56.8	n.a.	75.1	76.1	81.7	n.a.	112.1	n.a.
DE as % of GNP	6.06	9.38	9.06	18.49	12.0	10.9	13.06	4.6	n.a.	3.7	n.a.
Total military manpower	191,000	211,500	238,000	250,000	300,000	342,000	413,000	415,000	240,000	195,000	235,000
Reserves	—	315,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	400,000	400,000	440,000
Army											
Manpower	60,000	160,000	175,000	175,000	200,000	220,000	285,000	285,000	150,000	150,000	150,000
Reserves		300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	300,000	400,000	400,000	400,000
Equipment											
Medium tanks	860	860	920	1,160	1,360	1,620	1,620	1,735	1,735	1,410	1,770
Major types	M60A1,47	M60A1,47	M60A1,47	M60A1,47	Chieftain	Chieftain	Chieftain	Chieftain	Chieftain	Chieftain	Chieftain
					M60A1,47	M60A1,47	M60A1,47	M60A1,47	M60A1,47	M60A1,47	M60A1,47
Other AFVs	1,200	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,000	2,250	1,075	1,075	1,075	6,407	680+
Major types	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113	BTR,M113
Artillery	105,155mm	105,155mm	664+	714	714	714	782	782	1,072+	1,065	1,265+
SP guns	—	—	—	175,203mm	175,203mm	175,203mm	482	482	482	?	?
ATVs	TOW	TOW	TOW	106mm,TOW	106mm,TOW	106mm,TOW	106mm,TOW	106mm,TOW	106mm,TOW	106mm,TOW	106mm,TOW
AA weapons	40,57,85mm	40,57,85mm	23,40,57mm	650	650	650	1,900	1,900	1,900	?	1,800+
Missiles	SS11,12	Hawk,SS	Hawk,SS	Hawk,SS	Hawk,SS	Hawk,SS	Hawk,SS	Hawk,SS	Hawk,SS	665	67
Aircraft	104	104	119	171	308	401	669	715	725	665	67
Helicopters	84	82	58	110	247	332	627	650	660	600	572
Major types	AB-205/6A	AB-206A	AB-206A	AB-205A	Bell 214A	AH-1J	Bell 214A	Bell 214A	Bell 214A	Bell 214A	Bell 214A
Navy											
Manpower	9,000	11,500	13,000	15,000	18,500	22,000	28,000	30,000	20,000	10,000	10,000
Total craft	51	41	41	56	61	56	48	50	52	54	54
Destroyers	1	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Frigates	2	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
Patrol	28	14	14	29	29	24	16	17	20	14	19
Submarines	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—
Minesweepers	6	6	6	6	5	5	5	5	5	5	5
Landing ships/craft	4	4	4	2	4	4	4	3	3	3	3
Other	10	10	10	12	16	16	16	17	17	19	16
Aircraft	24	16	34	35	47	70	56	73	73	31	2
ASW	—	—	—	—	6	6	12	26	20	9	2
Major types	—	—	—	—	—	S-65A	SH-3D	SH-3D	SH-3D	SH-3D	D-3F
Transport	—	—	—	—	—	10	10	11	11	9	9
Major types	—	—	—	—	—	Shrike	Shrike	Shrike	Shrike	Shrike	Shrike
Rescue/Search	—	—	—	—	6	6	6	6	6	6	—
Helicopters	24	16	34	35	35	48	28	30	36	7	23
Major types	AB-206A	AB-212	AB-206A	AB-206A	AB-206A	AB-206A	SH-3D	AB-206	AB-206	AB-212	SH-3D

Source: The Military Balance (London: IISS, various years).

TAKEN FROM ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, "THE GULF AND THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY", (BOULDER, COLORADO: WESTVIEW PRESS, 1984), PP.726-727.

TABLE 2 The Military Buildup in Iraq, 1972-1983

	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81	1981-82	1982-83 ^a
Total Population (millions)	9.75	10.14	10.74	11.09	11.49	11.8	12.47	12.73	13.11	13.84	13.6
Defense Expenditures (\$ billions)	0.338	0.467	0.803	1.19	1.41	1.66	2.02	2.67	3.0	n.a.	n.a.
GNP (\$ billions)	3.5	5.0	5.6	13.4	14.2	16.3	15.05	21.4	39.0	n.a.	n.a.
DE as % of GNP	9.65	9.4	14.33	8.88	9.6	10.18	13.03	12.47	7.7	n.a.	n.a.
Total military manpower	101,800	101,800	112,500	135,000	158,000	188,000	212,000	222,000	242,250	252,250	342,250
Reserves	250,000	268,000	250,000	268,000	304,800	304,800	329,800	329,800	329,800	250,000	75,000
Army											
Manpower	90,000	90,000	100,000	120,000	140,000	140,000	160,000	180,000	190,000	210,000	300,000
Reserves		250,000		250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	250,000	75,000
Equipment											
Medium tanks	860	990	1,390	1,200	1,200	1,350	1,700	1,700	2,600	2,600	2,300
Major types	T-54,55,34	T-54,55,34	T-54,55,62	T-54,55,34	T-54,55,62	T-55,54,62	T-54,55,62	T-54,55,62	T-54,55,AMX	T-54,62,72	T-54,62,72
Other armored vehicles	300	1,300	1,300	1,300	1,600	1,800	1,620	1,700	2,500	2,100	3,000
Major types	AML, Ferret	BTR-152	BTR-152	BTR-152	BTR, BMP	BTR, BMP	BTR, BMP	BTR, BMP	BTR, BMP	BTR, BMP	BTR, BMP
Artillery	300	700	700	790	790	790	930	930	1,040	860	878+
SP guns	—	—	—	90	90	90	130	130	240	7	7
ATWs	—	—	—	—	—	Sagger, SS-11	Sagger, SS-11	Sagger, SS-11	Sagger, SS-11	Sagger, SS-11	Sagger, SS-11
AA weapons	—	included	included	800	800	800	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
Missiles	—	—	FROG SSM	SA-7SAM	SA-7SAM	27FROG	38FROG	38FROG	38FROG	19FROG	19FROG
Navy											
Manpower	2,000	2,000	2,000	3,000	3,000	3,000	4,000	4,000	4,250	4,250	4,250
Total craft	20	30	26	29	28	31	35	49	48	50	?
Patrol	4	13	9	13	11	14	14	31	29	28	?
Sub-chasers	3	3	3	3	3	3	3	—	—	—	—
Torpedo craft	12	12	12	13	12	12	10	40	10	10	?
Minesweepers	—	2	2	2	2	2	5	5	5	8	?
Other (type)	—	—	—	—	—	—	3(LCT)	3(LCT)	4(LCT)	4(LCT)	3(LCT)
Air Force											
Manpower	9,800	9,800	10,500	12,000	15,000	25,000	28,000	28,000	38,000	38,000	38,000
Total combat aircraft	189	224	278	247	299	369	339	339	332	335	335
Fighters	100	120	130	130	110	135	115	115	115	151	151
Major types	MiG-27,17	MiG-27,17	MiG-27,17	MiG-27,17	MiG-27,19	MiG-27,19	MiG-21	MiG-21	MiG-21	MiG-21	MiG-21
Fighter bombers	80	96	80	110	170	200	190	190	195	167	167
Major types	Su-7, Hunter	Su-7, Hunter	Su-7, Hunter	Su-7, MiG-23	Su-7B, Hunter	MiG-23, Su-7B	MiG-23, Su-7B	MiG-23, Su-7B	MiG-23, Su-7B	Su-20, MiG-23	Su-20, MiG-23
Medium-light bombers	9	8	8	7	19	14	22	22	22	17	17
Major types	Tu-16	Tu-16	Tu-16	Tu-16	Il-28, Tu-16	Il-28, Tu-16	Il-22, Il-28	Tu-22, Il-28	Tu-22, Il-28	Tu-22, Il-28	Tu-22, Il-28
Transports	33	27	28	30	45	47	45	45	56	68	58
Major types	An-24, Il-74	An-24, Il-74	An-2,24	An-2,24	Il-14, An-24	Il-14, An-24	Il-14, An-2	Il-14, An-2	Il-24,26	Il-24,26	Il-24,26
Helicopters	46	69	101	101	134	135	227	237	276	366	397
Major types	Mi-4, Mi-8	Mi-4, Mi-8	Mi-4, Mi-8	Mi-4, Mi-8	Alouette III, Mi-4	Alouette III, Mi-4	Alouette III, Mi-4	Mi-8, Mi-24	Mi-8,24	Mi-8,24	Mi-8,24
Paramilitary (total)	16-17,000	17-18,000	18-19,000	18-19,000	54,800	54,800	79,800	79,800	79,800	254,800	11,800
National Guard	10,000	10,000	10,000	10,000	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Security troops	3,800	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,800	4,800
Other	4-5,000	4-5,000	4-5,000	4-5,000	50,000 ^b	50,000 ^b	75,000 ^b	75,000 ^b	75,000 ^b	250,000	7,000

^a Some inaccuracy may occur due to war losses, and some Iranian equipment may have been taken into service.

^b People's Army

Source: *The Military Balance* (London: IISS, various years).

TAKEN FROM ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, "THE GULF AND THE SEARCH FOR STRATEGIC STABILITY", (BOULDER, COLORADO: WESTVIEW PRESS 1984), PP 744, 745